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To Brother Sixtus Robert,
sine quo non

"Quaestio tua oratio tua sit ••• "
William of St. Thierry
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The guiding question for the following inquiry is how
thought enables a thinker to understand. The end of the
inquiry is the exploration of this question. The means
employed is the interpretation of a book: The Proslogion, by
Anselm of Canterbury. In his Proslogion, Anselm attempts to
think his way to an understanding of God. I will argue that
his desire to understand God leads Anselm to shift his
conception of thinking. At the

beginn~ng

of the book, he

tries to use thinking about God to express what God is by
the analysis of what he believes God to be, but he finally
turns to think in other ways. First he turns to what he
calls "coniectatio," and then he turns to prayer.
This inquiry will raise important questions regarding
thinking, understanding, and the relationship between the
two. Anselm describes how he understands "thinking"
(cogitare) early in his small book, and he exemplifies that
description all the way through the work that follows. The
description he gives is, however, a general one, and as his
work progresses it exemplifies that general description in
very different ways. Though his treatment of "understanding"
(intelligere) is less explicit, we can deduce clearly enough
how he understands this word as well. Anselm aims at under-

2

standing, and he takes thinking as his means.
I take the interpretation of his thinking as my means
not just in order to understand Anselm, but to better understand the relationship between thinking and understanding.
When Anselm concludes his work by turning his thinking
towards God directly, he suggests to us the orientation
required by a thinking that is to lead towards understanding--at least towards an understanding of God.
Let us begin by considering the nature of the book. In
the preface to the Proslogion, Anselm describes his task in
a number of ways: in terms of distinctions between it and
the Monologion, in terms of the hope he has for the one
"argumentum" it contains, and in terms of the persona in
which it is written. He characterizes the work most strikingly, though, with the titles he gave it. It is telling
enough that he eventually named it the Proslogion. This
means, he reports, an "alloquium," which is to say a speech
to another or an address. 1 He calls it an address because
the book is a speech, or prayer, directed to God. Anselm
prays to God in the first chapter, in the last, and in many
places in between. I will argue that the work's composition
as a prayer is essential to it.
But Anselm did not originally call his work the

1

Anselm, Opera Omnia, ed. Franciscus Schmitt, (Edinburg:
Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1946) 1:94. "Alloquium" comes from
"ad-loquor," "to· speak to."

3

"Proslogion." He also reports that the title he originally
gave the book was "Fides Quaerens Intellectum" or "Faith
Seeking Understanding." 2 In order to chart the shifts in the
character of Anselm's thought I will attempt to establish
what this first title meant. To ask about the character of
Anselm's thinking is to ask how faith seeks understanding in
the Proslogion.
I can make one preliminary claim that is not controversial: that the search has something to do with discursive
reasoning, or analytical thought--at least in part with what
has come to be called "the ontological argument for the
existence of God." Anselm himself labels the insight he set
out to find an "argumentum," 3 and whether or not this word
is synonymous with our word "argument," much of the first
part of the Proslogion is in fact an argument of sorts: it
is an analysis of one way of stating what Anselm believes
God to be. We must ask, however, how the argument functions
as a part of his whole search. Is Anselm's search the search
for this argument? Is the search the analysis of the argument? Is the argument merely one stage in the search? Is it
a tool that leads the seeker to seek in some other way? I
will argue that it is, first and foremost,

just such a tool.

It is important to recognize at the start, however, that
it is not at all obvious that thinking is a suitable means
2

Ibid.

3

Ibid.
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of seeking to understand God. Augustine, who was a great authority for Anselm, points to the problem in his work On the
Trinity. Anselm makes it clear, in the preface to the
Monologion, that just this work was decisive for him. There,
Anselm def ends himself against anyone who would attack his
own work as novel by arguing that he writes nothing in the
Monologion that is not in Augustine's work:
If it should seem to anyone that I have put forth anything in this little work that either is too novel or
that differs from the truth, I ask that he not immediately shout that I introduce novelty or assert falsity,
but that he first study diligently the books by ••• Augustine On the Trinity, and that he then decide about my
little work according to them. 4
For Anselm to point to On the Trinity in the preface to this
earlier work does not assure that he thinks of it as decisive for the Proslogion as well. For now, however, it is
enough to notice the problem that Augustine faces in that
work, and to realize that Augustine's problem must have been
on Anselm's mind.
In the last of the fifteen books of On the Trinity,
Augustine describes at some length how human thinking fails.
I want to consider that account, but before doing so it is
worth noting that in Book 8 of the same work Augustine
raises the possibility of using speech to understand God in

4

Ibid., 8: " ••• si cui videbitur, quod in eodem opusculo
aliquid protulerim, quod aut nimis novum sit aut a veritate
dissentiat: rogo, ne statimme aut praesumptorem novitatum aut
falsitatis assertorem exclamet, sed prius libros praefati
doctoris Augustini De trinitate diligenter perspiciat, deinde
secundum eos opusculum meum diiudicet."

5

a manner that is not discursive.
He has spent the first seven books interpreting passages
of scripture. By taking what he finds in scripture concerning the Trinity as authoritative, he can draw conclusions
about the Trinity that are certain to be true. He does not,
however, think that such accumulated knowledge itself brings
him or his reader to understand the Trinity, and so he
devotes the remaining eight books of the work to various
attempts to understand what the first seven books enable him
know.
In the eighth book, he makes his first such attempt.
Augustine describes how thinking disturbs understanding. He
exhorts one not to think, but to remain in a flash of light
that shines when one hears "truth":
Behold, see if you can: God is truth. For this has been
written: "Since God is light." [See] not as your eyes
see, but as the heart sees when it hears: "He is truth."
Do not ask what truth is; for at once mists of corporeal
images and clouds of phantasms will present themselves
and disturb the fair weather that was clear for you at
the first flash, when I said "truth." Behold, remain if
you can in that first flash by which you are dazzled as
though by a shock. 5
He goes on to deny that one can remain in that flash:
5

Augustine, Obras de San Agustin en Edicion Bilingue,
vol. 5, Tratado sobre la Santisima Trinitad, trans. and ed.
Luis Arias, (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1956),
502: " ••• ecce vide, si potes: Deus veritas est. Hoc enim
scriptum est: Quoniam Deus lux est: non quomodo isti oculi
vident, sed quomodo videt cor, cum audis: Veritas est. Noli
quaerere quid sit veritas; statim enim se opponent caligines
imaginum corporalium et nubila phantasmatum, et perterbabunt
serenitatem, quae primo ictu diluxit tibi, cum dicerem:
"Veritas". Ecce in ipso primo ictu quo velut coruscatione
perstringeris, cum dicitur: "Veritas", mane si potes ••• "

6

"But you cannot; you will slip back into those habitual and
earthly (ways]." 6 He does nothing at that point to explain
why one will "slip back." He merely points to "the bird-lime
of desire" and "the errors of (our] wanderings." One of the
earthly ways he refers to is the habit of articulating and
thinking through questions, and he goes on in Book 15 to
explain why just such thinking interferes with the attempt
to understand.
There, Augustine writes of two sorts of human speech: a
silent word spoken within, and the words--spoken, either in
silence or out loud, in the languages that people share-with which one attempts to say this word. Augustine does not
think that these spoken words ever perfectly articulate the
word within. Since that inner word is the one with which one
knows whatever one knows, the spoken words do not articulate
knowledge. His account emerges as his discussion of the
human image of the Trinity draws to a close.
Since one aspect of the Trinity he would like to under-

6

Ibid.: "sed non pates: relaberis in ista solita atque
terrena."
Two major translators read the first clause "sed [si] non
pates":
The editor of the Spanish bilingual edition, F. Luis
Arias, translates, "Permanece, si pedes, en la clearheaded
inicial de este rapido fulgor de la verdad; pero, si esto no
tees posible ••• "
Stephen Mckenna offers, "Remain in it, if you can, but if
you cannot ••• " (St. Augustine, The Trinity, trans. Stephen
McKenna, Washington D.C.: Catholic Univ. Press, 1963), 247.)
I do not know why they both thought that Augustine
intended us to ~upply "si. " The paragraph makes good sense
without doing so.

7

stand is the Word that it speaks, he must see how human
speech, the speech of the image of that Trinity, is that
Word's image. He begins his account by noting two facts
abou.t the manner in which thought is spoken of in the New
Testament: that thinking is described as inner speech 7 and
that this speech is sometimes heard, but sometimes seen, by
Jesus. He concludes that there must be some inner speech
that "does not

b~long

to any of those languages that are

called the languages of peoples." 8 This word is the thought
formed from knowledge, and to speak it is to speak the
truth:
For it is necessary that, whenever we speak truly--that
is, [when] we say what we know--[then], from the very
knowledge that we hold with our memory, a word is born
that is entirely of the same kind as the knowledge from
which it is born. Indeed, the thought formed from that
thing which we know is a word that we say in the heart. 9
To the extent that the inner word is the same as the
knowledge from which it is born, it mirrors the equality
between the Word and the Father, its source. Augustine goes
on to explain that human speech is an incarnation of the
human word and is similar in this sense to the Word that be-

7

We will see that the description of thinking as inner
speech is decisive for Anselm, too.
8

Augustine, 866: "hoc enim quod ad nullam pertinet
linguam, earum scilicet quae linguae appelantur gentium."
9

Ibid., 868: "Necesse est enim cum verum loquimur, id
est, quod scimus loquimur, ex ipsa scientia quam memoria
tenemus, nascatur verbum quod eiusmodi sit omnino, cuiusmodi
est illa scientia de qua nascitur. Formata quippe cogitatio ab
ea re quam scimus, verbum est quod in corde dicimus."

8
comes flesh:
For just as our word becomes a (spoken] utterance,
[which is], in a certain way, of the body, by assuming
that [utterance] in which it may be made evident to the
senses of men, just so the Word of God was made flesh by
assuming that (utterance] in which it itself might be
made evident to the senses of men. 10
But though this word is, in some ways, a fitting image
of God, it is also quite different from that Word, and just
this difference is important, because the difficulty that
thinking in words presents for Anselm lies in the difference
between the way we speak our word and the incarnation of the
Word. Unfortunately, Augustine's account says little of this
difference. Instead, he addresses the differences between
the human inner word and the Word. A passage in Book 11 of
the Confessions, however, sheds some light. It points towards the temporal character of speech.
Time is important even in the account in The Trinity,
though it is related there to the formation of the human
inner word: the last difference Augustine identifies between
that inner word and the Word is that the former comes to be
and passes away in time:
And then indeed our word will not be false, because we
shall neither lie nor be deceived. Perhaps too our
thoughts will not revolve, passing back and forth from
some things to others, but we shall see all our knowledge in a single gaze. Nevertheless, even when it is
thus, even if it is thus, (and] the creature [i.e. our
thought] that can be formed is so (completely] formed
10

Ibid. , 8 6 8 : "Ita enim verbum nostrum vox quodam modo
corporis fit, assumendo earn in qua manifestetur sensibus
hominum; sicut Verbum Dei caro factum est, assumendo earn in
qua et ipsum manifestaretur sensibus hominum."

9

that nothing that it ought to attain is missing from its
form, nevertheless [even then] it will not be made equal
to that simplicity where nothing that is formable has
been formed or reformed, but [there is only] form;
neither unformed nor formed, there the substance is
eternal and immutable. 11
That is what he says in On the Trinity. The passage we
will consider from The Confessions is useful because it
shows that at least one aspect of the temporality at issue
in language is temporality in the most straight-forward
sense: words take time to say. Insofar as the insight one
strives to express with words is not extended in time, the
words and the insight are incommensurable.
In the Confessions, Augustine compares the words with
which God is reported in Genesis to have created the world
with the words with which God is said, in the Gospel, to
have recognized his son as his son. He asks, "How did You
speak? Was it in the way that the utterance was made that
said from the cloud:

'This is my beloved son? ' " 12 He replies

that the voice from the cloud was spoken in time, and he
11

Ibid., 890: "Et tune quidem verbum nostrum non erit
falsum, quia neque mentiemur, neque fallemur: fortassis etiam
volubiles non erunt nostrae cogitationes ab aliis in alia
euntes atque redeuntes, sed omnem scientam nostram uno simul
conspectu videbimus: tamen cum et hoc fuerit, si et hoc
fuerit, formata erit creatura quae formabilis fuit, ut nihil
iam desit eius formae, ad quam pervenire deberet; sed tamen
coaequanda non erit illi simplicitati, ubi non formabile
aliquid formatum vel reformatum est, sed forma; neque
informis, neque formata, ipsa ibi aeterna est immutabilisque
substantia."
12

Augustine, Confessiones, ed. M Skutella, (Leipzig:
Teubner, 1934), 269: "Sed quomodo dixisti? numquid illo modo,
quo facta est vox de nube dicens: Hie est filius meus
dilectus?"

10
goes on to explain, "The syllables sounded and went by, the
second after the first, the third after the second and from
there, in order, until the last one [sounded] after the
others and [there was] silence after the last one." 13 He
also emphasizes that the temporally arranged sounding of
such words shows that they belong to the motion of a creature, which is temporal. 14
Now, though this account does not exactly correspond to
the one from On the Trinity, a straight-forward picture of
the latter begins to emerge as long as the two are parallel:
the difference between human speech and the Word of God may
be that a difference exists between human speech and the
word within, the word from which it is born. The words we
use when we try to speak our inner word take time to say.
They do not precisely reproduce the word within, a word that
is formed, Augustine says, "by a single gaze at once" (uno
simul conspectu). 15 One might, he says, occasionally "see
all our knowledge in a single gaze, " 16 but the movement by
which one tries to put that single gaze into words shatters

13

Ibid.: "Sonuereunt syllabae atque transierunt, secunda
post primum, tertia post secundam atque inde ex ordine, donec
ultima post ceteras silentiumque post ultimam."
14

Ibid.: "Unde claret atque eminet, quod creaturae motus
expressit
earn
serviens
aeternae
voluntati
tuae
ipse
temporalis."
15

The Trinity, 890.

16

The Trinity, 890.

11
its unity by scattering it through time. 17
The desire to achieve a simple, instantaneous understanding by means of thinking is just the difficulty Anselm
faces in the Prosloqion. He suggests this right from the
start when he declares, in the book's preface, his desire to
find a single argument. But it is much more explicit in the
manner in which he summarizes, in Chapter 18, the result of
that argument. He writes, "My narrow understanding cannot
see [God's qualities] in one simultaneous gaze in order to
delight in them all simultaneously.

1118

We must insist, however, that in the face of what might
look, at that point, like failure, Anselm does not give up
on thinking. When he concludes that analytic thinking, or
reasoning, cannot bring him to the understanding he desires,
he does not turn away from thinking, but shifts towards
other manners of thought. I will chart this shift. I will
argue that Anselm's discovery that thinking cannot enable
him to say what God is only leads him to command himself to
ask how good God· must be, and then to ask for the understanding that he lacks. Anselm's thinking, his inner speech,
shifts from analysis, or reasoning, to what he calls
coniectatio, and then to prayerful address. These shifts are
17

A vivid picture of this "scattering" of the understanding by thought is presented long after Anselm's time in the
anonymous work, The Cloud of Unknowing.
18

Anselm, 114: "non potest angustus intellectus meus tot
uno simul intui tu videre, ut omnibus simul delectetur. " I will
have to return to this line.

12
faith's search for understanding, and their result determines the Proslogion's ultimate character as a prayer.
The difficulties that Anselm faces as he strives to
understand God can thus be described in general terms. If
understanding is an insight that comes all at once, and
thinking is characteristically discursive, what connection
can there be between the two? How can an activity that
progresses through time lead to another that happens suddenly, or all at once? How can speech bring about vision?
My interpretation of one work by one man can hardly
offer decisive answers to these questions. But by charting
where one man's struggle with such questions leads him, I
can hope at least to understand one way to face these questions.
Anselm's book finishes as a prayer, but it starts out as
a prayer as well. The progress Anselm makes brings him back,
in a sense, to the point from which he begins. This is not
to say that he has made no progress at all. He prays at the
end of his book with a far richer understanding of just
where he stands. It is, perhaps, this richer understanding
that permits him to pray at the end of the book with confidence that he does not show at its start. In the very last
chapter he writes:
Lord, through Your Son You command, or rather You counsel [us] to seek, and You promise that we shall receive
so that our joy might be complete. I seek, Lord, what
You counsel [us] through our admirable counsellor; may I
receive what You promise through Your truth, so that my

13
joy might be complete • 19
Thus even if Anselm's progress is both from prayer as a
beginning and to prayer as an end, his progress is progress
nonetheless. Such progress is not unique to him, not even
among philosophers. I myself think of Aristotle. He argues,
in the Metaphysics, that philosophy begins in wonder, and,
in the Ethics, that it ends in contemplation. It is interesting to note that his word for wonder, "8&•µi~c~'"
(thaumazein), and his word for contemplation, "Gcmpt &"
(theoria), are probably cognates, both related to a word,
11

G:i&" (thea), that means spectacle or sight. Contemplation

is not the same as simple wonder, but both wonder and contemplation are rooted in vision. For Aristotle too, at least
in a sense, the work of thinking takes us to the place from
which it starts.

19

Anselm, 121: "Domine, per Filium tuum iubes, immo
consulis petere et promittis accipere, ut gaudium nostrum
plenum sit. Peto, Domine, quod consulis per admirabilem
consiliarium nostrum; accipiam, quod promittis per veritatem
tuam, ut gaudium meum plenum sit."

CHAPTER 2
THE ANALYSIS OF ANSELM'S ARGUMENT

Anselm's Proslogion is a prayer. It is, however, an
unusual one. Much of the book is devoted to reasoning: specifically, to the analysis of a statement with which Anselm
expresses what he believes God to be. This is odd: when one
thinks about prayer, one does not think first of analysis.
When one thinks about analysis, one does not think first of
prayer.
The apparent topic of the book's first set of reasonings
is more surprising still. In its second and third chapters,
Anselm appears to aim at establishing the existence of the
God he addresses. I will eventually argue this is not the
case. Nevertheless, that this is how the analyses in Chapters 2 and 3 appear cannot be denied. The tradition that
interprets the passages as such an argument is too long and
too rich. Any interpretation of the book must begin by
facing it.
I shall ultimately argue neither for nor against the
authors within this tradition. Most of them are less concerned with the extent to which such an argument is indeed
an interpretation of Anselm's work than they are with the
14

15
rigor of one or more versions of the argument, and I am less
concerned with the rigor of any particular argument than
with the role that an argument plays within a prayer. This
is not at all to say that the validity of his arguments was
of no importance to Anselm, or even that it is of no importance to me. It is only to say that the main issue for me is
the place of argument within Anselm's effort to understand
God. Let there be no mistake: to understand God was Anselm's
explicit goal. Because I aim to understand the place of
Anselm's argument, I will eventually insist on leaving his
argument in its place. Rather than freeing it from its
context in order to investigate the full force of the range
of arguments that Anselm's strategy suggests, I will interpret that strategy as Anselm himself states it.
I shall nevertheless first consider that part of the
book that appears to be an argument for the existence of
God, and I shall consider it as just such an argument. In
this chapter, I shall investigate two types of current
analysis of Anselm's argument. I shall argue that the versions of the argument that have been discussed by the contemporary analytic philosophers I discuss are inconclusive
because they depend on a premise that some are willing to
deny: that God is even possible. Those within the analytic
tradition who would support some version of Anselm's argument, whether they do so with an appeal to ordinary language
or they do so with an appeal to a private belief, must

16
appeal to something outside of the argument itself. This
fact does not distinguish their versions of the argument
from any other argument. Arguments have assumptions. It
does, however, invite us look carefully at just what Anselm
assumes, or start with. I will take their need to look
outside of the argument as my invitation to look back to
Anselm himself in order to show what he himself appeals to.
The reasons for beginning by attempting to determine
whether Anselm in fact proves that God exists are of several
kinds: there is the weight of the tradition I have already
referred to, one that has used various ways of construing
Anselm's analyses to determine whether there can be an
ontological argument for the existence of God; there is
direct evidence, within the book's second and third chapters, that suggests that he himself thought he had discovered a proof that God exists; and there is other evidence,
dependant upon studies either of the entire Proslogion or of
more of Anselm's work, that points in the same direction.
The tradition that uses the Proslogion as the source of
arguments for the existence of God began in Anselm's lifetime, and continues to this day. Anselm's older contemporary, Gaunilo of Marmoutier, wrote a reply to the Proslogion
so interesting to Anselm that he asked those who had already
copied the book to attach both Gaunilo's reply and his own

17
reply to Gaunilo to their copies. 1 Even today, standard
editions of the book include the two replies. Since Gaunilo,
the tradition has included European philosophy's most important authors: Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Descartes,
Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume, Kant, and Hegel. Nor has interest in
the argument been limited to the philosophers: the tale of
Anselmo in Don Quixote suggests a harsh rejection of the
attempt to prove that God exists.
The debate continues in this century. Even if Richard
Swinburne finds that ontological arguments "are unpersuasive
for well-known reasons" and believes that "everyone who
reflects on them ought to find the same," 2 Anselm's argument
remains a matter for dispute. Richard Findlay, Norman
Malcolm, Charles Hartshorne, and Alvin Plantinga, among
others, have written on the argument.
The existence of this tradition, however, is not by
itself reason enough to interpret the book as an argument

1

The Life of St. Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, by
Eadmer, ed. and trans. R.W. Southern, (Oxford: Clarendon,
1972), 31: "[The Proslogion] came into the hands of someone
who found fault with one of the arguments in it, judging it to
be unsound. In an attempt to refute it he wrote a treatise
against it and attached this to the end of Anselm's work. A
friend sent this to Anselm who read it with pleasure, expressed his thanks to the critic and wrote his reply to the
criticism. He had this reply attached to the treatise which
had been sent to him, and returned it to the friend from whom
it had come, desiring him and others who might deign to have
his little book to write out at the end of it the criticism of
his argument and his own reply to the criticism."
2

Richard Swinburne, "God's Necessary Being," Archivio Di
Filosofia 1-3 (1990): 538.
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for the existence of God. In fact, that there is such a
tradition might come as a surprise to someone reading the
book for the first time. Anselm devotes very little of the
Proslogion to analyses that seem to concern God's existence,
and although he argues for other claims in much of the rest
of the book, there are large sections that are not analyses
at all. He himself calls the book a "proslogion" or an
"alloquy." This is to say a speech-towards, or an address,
not a proof, or a discourse.
Nevertheless, Anselm does seem to announce directly that
his task is to prove that God exists, and this in two ways.
In the preface to the work he writes that he sought an
argument that would suffice, among other things, "to affirm
that God truly is." 3 I shall have more to say about what
this phrase in fact means, but both standard translations of
the book into English, and many other translations as well,
reflect what the phrase is generally taken to mean: that
Anselm seeks an argument that proves the existence of God.
M.J. Charlesworth renders the phrase "to prove that God
really exists." 4 _S.N. Deane offers "to demonstrate that God
truly exists. " 5
If that phrase is not enough, we need only turn to the
3

Anselm, 93: "ad astruendum quia Deus vere est."

St. Anselm's Proslogion, trans. M.J. Charlesworth,
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1979), 103.
5

St. Anselm: Basic Writings,
Salle: Open Court, 1962), 1.

trans.

S.N.

Deane,

(La
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end of the second chapter. There, Anselm seems to state
clearly enough that he has indeed proven that God exists. He
writes that "there exists, therefore, beyond doubt, something than which a greater cannot be thought, both in the
understanding and in fact." 6
In addition to the weight of a great tradition and the
direct evidence of Anselm's words, there is a third class of
reasons for supposing that Anselm sought to prove that God
exists. Scholars of Anselm's work have based the claim that
this was Anselm's task on studies both of the Proslogion as
a whole and of the two replies. I shall consider three such
arguments: one by Franciscus Schmitt .and two by Kurt Flasch.
Schmitt, surely the most learned Anselm scholar of our
century, edited the standard critical Latin edition of
Anselm's works and translated a number of the works into
German. He, more than anyone, has been attentive both to the
words Anselm uses and to the style he employs in using them.
Schmitt bases his interpretation of the Proslogion on a
careful look at Anselm's rhetoric. What he discovers is that
the style Anselm uses in the passages in which he argues is
different from the style of the rest of the work. Schmitt
also points out that both Anselm and his biographer-student,
Eadmer, report that the argument was a sudden discovery. He
concludes from these two facts that Anselm most likely dis-
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covered some core argument first and only afterwards composed an address around it. 7
Why did Anselm set his argument into an address? Schmitt
answers that Anselm probably chose that form so that the
Proslogion's style would contrast with that of its companion
work, the Monologion, which is a monologue, or discourse. 8
In any case, Schmitt concludes that the Proslogion is essentially, like the other work, an attempt to establish that
certain truths of faith accord with reason. 9 He thinks that
its style is simply its wonderful style, and has nothing to
do with the heart of the work:
The dressing up [of the work]
second element [of the work],
ful, almost unique character,
remove from the kernel of the

in a prayer is merely the
which gives it its wonderbut does not at all aim to
work its speculative character.

The other arguments I shall consider are quite differ7
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ent. They are made by a prominent German medievalist, Kurt
Flasch, though he himself points out that his main argument
had already been made by Schmitt. He considers the character
of two debates that Anselm engages in: one with the fool,
who is the imagined interlocutor of the early part of the
Proslogion, and one with Gaunilo of Marmoutier, who wrote a
reply to Anselm on behalf of that fool.
With respect to the first, Flasch claims that the fool
is what we now call an "atheist." Flasch admits that Anselm
does not use the word "atheist," but he insists that it is
our word for precisely the opponent that Anselm has in mind:
Of course Anselm does not use the word "atheism," which
first came into use around 1600. But he describes with
clarity the position that he sought, by means of his
argument, to reveal to be absurd: the denial of the
existence of a being "beyond which a more perfect cannot
be thought." 11
Flasch claims that the fool is just a name Anselm gives to
one who would later be called an atheist, 12 and that
Anselm's goal is to show the atheist's position to be untenable.
But Flasch's understanding of Anselm's fool is not his
main reason for thinking that the arguments in the early
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chapters are attempts to prove the existence of God. More
decisive for him is the character of Anselm's exchange with
Gaunilo. 13 Flasch points out, first, that Gaunilo seems to
aim only to show that Anselm has not proven the existence of
God and, then, that Anselm responds not by claiming that
Gaunilo has misunderstood him, but by addressing Gaunilo's
case point by point. 14 Flasch implies that if Anselm had
intended anything but a proof of the existence of God, he
could have avoided Gaunilo's attack entirely by insisting
that Gaunilo had missed the point. Anselm did not do so. He
must, Flasch concludes, have intended a proof that God
exists. The book's composition as a prayer is, according to
Flasch, a "stylization" (Stilisierung). He writes, "If one
reads the Proslogion in the context of the discussion between Anselm and Gaunilo, the religious stylization present
in the text reveals itself as just that: a stylization." 15
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The exchange between Anselm and Gaunilo is, in Flasch' s
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I will eventually reject the grounds for trying to
understand the Proslogion as an attempt to prove the existence of God. They are, however, reason enough for beginning
to consider the book that way, and it is not hard to know
where to start. Anselm discusses God's existence most explicitly in two chapters, the second.and the third. Let us
now turn to the argument or arguments that he makes.
In the second chapter, Anselm identifies God as "that
than which a greater cannot be thought, " 16 and argues that
such a one must at least be in the understanding, because
the words, when spoken, are understood. He then asks whether
that than which a greater cannot be thought could be solely
in the understanding, and he answers that it could not. He
reasons that a being is greater if it is in fact (in re)
than if it is only in the understanding. Since that than
which a greater cannot be thought can be thought to be in
fact, he deduces that if it were to be in the understanding
alone, then a being greater than it--one thought to be in
fact--would be thinkable. Therefore, that than which a
greater cannot be thought must be in fact, and God must
necessarily be. 17

16

Anselm, 101: "Et quidem credimus te esse aliquid quo
nihil maius cogitari possit."
17

What Anselm literally concludes is that "something than
which a greater cannot be thought exists, beyond doubt, both
in the understanding and in fact." Anselm, 102: "Existit ergo
procul dubio aliquid quo maius cogitari non valet, et
intellectu et in re."

24

So ends Chapter 2, but as if that were not enough,
Anselm goes on to argue in Chapter 3 that the non-being of
God is not only impossible, but unthi.nkable. He argues that
something can be thought to be that is so great that it does
not admit of being thought not to be. This, he claims, would
be greater than something that can be thought not to be.
Thus, that than which a greater cannot be thought must be
such that it cannot even be thought not to be.
These analyses may seem simple, but they have been the
source of centuries of debate. In order to enter that debate, I shall consider it as it stands now, by looking at
two authors who have, in very different ways, defended
versions of the argument recently. 18 They are Norman Malcolm
and Alvin Plantinga.
Malcolm's position is that Anselm sets out, in the
second and third chapters of the Proslogion, two distinguishable "pieces of reasoning" for the conclusion that God
exists, and that one and only one of the "pieces" is a
rigorous argument. 19 He claims that by means of the first
argument, the one in Chapter 2, Anselm aims to show that God
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exists by showing that "something a greater than which
cannot be conceived" exists. He believes that Anselm aims in
Chapter 3 to show that God exists by showing that such a
being necessarily exists.
I shall consider Malcolm's versions of each of these
arguments in its turn. His version of the first can be put
as follows:
O. God is something a greater than which cannot be
conceived.
1. Something a greater than which cannot be conceived
exists in the understanding.
2. What exists in the understanding can be conceived to
exist in reality.
3. To exist in reality as well as in the understanding
is greater than to exist solely in the understanding.
4. Something a greater than which cannot be conceived
must exist in reality.
5. God must exist in reality. 20
I should also consider the arguments for the steps in
this proof. Malcolm takes 0. as a "definition" of "God." As
Anselm's evidence for 1., Malcolm claims that:
Even the fool of the Psalm who says that there is no
God, when he hears this very thing that Anselm says,
namely, "something a greater than which cannot be conceived," understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding though he does not understand that it exists. 21
Malcolm goes on to explain this by saying that, for Anselm,
to be understood and to be in the understanding are the same
thing, that Anselm "uses intelligitur and in intellectu est
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as interchangeable locutions." 22 To say that a being is in
the understanding, then, is to say that words that express
what that being is are understood.
Malcolm does not argue for 2, though he does suggest an
explanation: "Of course many things may exist in the understanding that do not exist in reality; for example,
elves. " 23
He considers 3. at some length, and points out that
Anselm deduces 4. from the steps that precede it. He finally
rejects 3., and we should consider why. He claims that a
doctrine that existence is a perfection underlies Anselm's
position, and he rejects this doctrine. He offers the following expression of the doctrine: "An equivalent way of
putting this interesting proposition, in more current terminology, is: something is greater if it is both conceived of
and exists than if it is merely conceived of. " 24 Malcolm
first finds this doctrine "remarkably queer, " 25 and eventually finds it "false. " 26 He explains the former claim with
an example, "A king might desire that his next chancellor
should have knowledge, wit, and resolution; but it is ludicrous to add that the king's desire is to have a chancellor
22

Ibid.

23

Ibid., 137.

24

Ibid., 138.

25

Ibid., 139.

26

Ibid., 140.

27
who exists. " 27
Malcolm concludes that existence, far from being a
perfection, is not a quality, or predicate, at all, and he
claims that his own position is nothing but a restatement of
a point made by Kant. 28 He finally admits, however, that he
himself has no argument beyond what Kant has already offered. "It would be desirable," he writes, "to have a rigorous refutation of the doctrine but I have not been able to
provide one. I am compelled to leave the matter at the more
or less intuitive level of Kant's refutation." 29
But even if modesty leads Malcolm to refer to Kant, we
should notice that his position is no mere appeal to authority. We can sense this if we pause to consider the strange
language Malcolm uses in rejecting the claim that existence
is a

p~rfection.

He writes, as I mentioned, that he finds it

"remarkably queer, " and he proceeds to show with examples
how queer it is. When Malcolm points out how strange it
would be for a king to desire a chancellor who exists, he is
pointing out that we simply do not speak that way. He is not
denying that a king presented with that odd choice would
prefer an existent chancellor. He is saying that to treat
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existence as a desirable quality, or possible perfection,
violates our ordinary use of language. When he points to
Kant, he is not deferring to him as to an authority. He is
merely saying that his own argument by examples leaves the
matter more or less where Kant's example of 100 thalers
does.
With this admission, Malcolm turns to the second "piece
of reasoning," but we should not follow him before considering ourselves where his position leaves the first version of
the argument. Let us go straight to the position Kant takes.
His "intuitive" refutation has not persuaded everyone. Alvin
Plantinga, for example, rejects Kant's position. He writes
that "it is very_ doubtful that Kant specified a sense of 'is
a predicate' such that, in that sense, it is clear both that
existence is not a predicate and that Anselm's argument
requires that it be one. 30
We should sketch Plantinga's claim. He first describes
what it means for concepts to be equivalent, discussing two
possible concepts of the Taj Mahal. He labels them Cl and
C3. He defines Cl as the whole concept of the Taj Mahal. By
this he means the concept that is entirely adequate to its
object. In his words, the "whole concept" is "the concept
whose content includes all (and only) the properties the
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object in question has." 31 C3 is "the whole concept of the
Taj Mahal diminished with respect to existence. " 32 As odd as
Plantinga's use of the word "diminished" might be, what he
means is clear enough. In order for the whole concept of the
Taj Mahal to be adequate to its object, the Taj Mahal itself, it must include the existence of the building as an
attribute of the building. To say that the concept has been
"diminished" with respect to an attribute is only to say
that the attribute in question is not predicated of the
concept.
Plantinga then claims that for Kant to argue that 100
real thalers are no more than 100 imagined ones amounts to a
claim that Cl and C3 are "equivalent concepts, " 33 but he
does not judge whether Kant's claim about thalers is correct. Instead, he insists that it is not relevant. It is
possible, he says, to argue that God must be even without
assuming--as Malcolm claims Anselm's first argument does-that existence is a predicate. As Plantinga puts it:
Anselm maintains that the concept the being than which
none greater can be conceived is necessarily exemplified; that this is so is in no way inconsistent with the
suggestion that the whole concept of a thing diminished
with respect to existence is equivalent to the undiminished whole concept of that thing. Anselm argues that
the proposition God exists is necessarily true; but
neither this claim nor his argument for it entails or
presupposes that existence is a predicate in the sense
31
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just explained. 34
He claims, in other words, that Anselm could insist that
God must be even without thinking that to do so adds to his
concept of God. Plantinga explains his claim by arguing that
it is one thing to claim that God exists, quite another to
claim that God necessarily exists. He thinks that Anselm's
argument can and.does suppose that necessary existence is a
predicate without supposing that mere existence is one. Let
me note: we shall see that this is precisely the tack taken
by Malcolm in his "second piece of reasoning."
Plantinga reports, however, that Kant takes a different
view. Kant does not think "God exists" could be necessarily
true. He writes:
If, in an identical proposition, I reject the predicate
while retaining the subject, contradiction results; and
I therefore say that the former belongs necessarily to
the latter. But if we reject subject and predicate
alike, there is no contradiction; for nothing is then
left that can be contradicted. 35
Kant seems to claim that, even if there is an argument that
we cannot posit ''God" without positing "exists", we might
still be able to deny "God," because it is only once we have
posited "God" that "exists" becomes necessary. When we deny
"God," nothing remains to which "exists" necessarily belongs.
Anselm's argument, however, explicitly calls into ques34
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tion whether his interlocutor can deny "God." The first
point he makes about the fool is that when the fool hears
"that than which none greater can be thought," he understands what he hears. Anselm infers from this that such a
being is in the understanding--even in the fool's understanding--even if the fool does not understand such a being
to be. Anselm thus concludes, and does not merely assert,
that God is in the understanding. What he takes to be an
established f act--that even the fool understands--becomes
his evidence that God is in the fool's understanding at
least. He then uses this conclusion to show that God must
be. If we could simply deny "God," as Kant asserts we can,
there might indeed be nothing for the denial of the existence of God to contradict. But neither Anselm nor his fool
can do so. In the face of Anselm's evidence to the contrary,
Kant must show the possibility of such a denial, and this he
does not do.
For all this, it is enough to note right now that the
fact that Plantinga argues against Kant at some length
establishes at the very least that Kant's position does not
appeal to everyone as it appeals to Malcolm. Even if
Malcolm's Kantian refutation is correct, it has not persuaded all. Even so, if we assume that Malcolm's Kantian rejection of Anselm's first argument is inadequate we still need
not accept the first argument. As I already suggested, there
are issues concerning the possibility of God's existence
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that the argument leaves unanswered. I shall address these
as I consider what Malcolm takes to be Anselm's second
argument.
Let us turn to it now. His way of construing what he
calls Anselm's "second ontological argument" 36 can be summarized as follows:

O. God is a being than which a greater cannot be conceived.
1. A being whose non-existence is logically impossible
can be conceived.
2. Such a being is greater than a being whose non-existence is logically possible.
3. God's non-existence must be logically impossible.
I shall again consider each step. Though Malcolm gave no
explanation of O. in the first version of the argument, he
does so here by affirming that it is in line with one use of
the word "God." He writes:
There certainly is A use of the word "God," and I think
far the more common use, in accordance with which the
statements "God is the greatest of all beings," "God is
the most perfect being," "God is the supreme being," are
logically necessary truths, in the same sense that the
statement "A square has four sides" is a logically
necessary truth. 37
For Malcolm, Anselm's "definition" is equivalent to these
statements, which are "logically necessary truths," in as
much as this is what is most often meant by "God."
Malcolm has the most to say about 2. He explains in some
detail how he understands Anselm's use of "greater." He
understands Anselm's claim here to be different from the
36
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claim Anselm makes in the first argument. There, Malcolm had
interpreted Anselm's use of "greater" to be a reflection of
the claim that existence is a perfection. Here, Malcolm
argues that Anselm's claim is that necessary existence is a
perfection.
Malcolm rejected the claim about existence by appealing
to an example illustrating how we usually speak. He accepts
the claim about necessary existence in much the same way. To
this end he discusses what he calls "the notion of dependance, " 38 arguing that, "If we reflect on the common meaning
of the word 'God', ••. we realize that it is incompatible
with this meaning that God's existence should depend on anything.

"39

He goes on to explain that our conception of God

as an unlimited being includes more than just unlimited
power. It also includes unlimited existence. God's being
cannot depend on anything, and nothing can prevent God from
being. According to Malcolm, this is what Anselm's definition of God means:
God is usually conceived of as an unlimited being. He is
conceived of as a being who could not be limited, that
is, as an absolutely unlimited being. This is no less
than to conceive of Him as something a greater than
which cannot be conceived. If God is conceived to be an
absolutely unlimited being He must be conceived to be
unlimited in regard to His existence as well as His
operation. In this conception it will not make sense to
say that He depends on anything for coming into or
continuing in existence. Nor, as Spinoza observed, will
it make any sense to say that something could prevent
38
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Him from existing. 40
Malcolm thus excludes two possibilities: nothing could
prevent God from coming to be, and nothing could remove God
from being.
Malcolm suggests, however, that there is one more possibility: God might just happen not to be. Even if no reason
can be given for God's not being, even if that non-being
cannot be thought, God might not exist. It might appear,
after all, that the existence of God and our power to think
that existence are distinct issues. So too for God's nonexistence and our inability to think it. Perhaps God does
not exist even though that non-existence cannot be thought.
Malcolm anticipates this objection, and he rejects it.
He argues that God could "just happen" not to exist only if
God's non-existence were possible and that, if it were
possible that God should just happen not to exist, then,
even if God did exist, God's non-existence would be thinkable--at least in the sense that we could ask meaningful
questions about it. This is to say th.at the possibility that
God might not exist entails that God's non-existence is
thinkable. Malcolm explains that:
from the supposition that it could happen that God did
not exist it would follow that, if He existed, He would
have mere duration and not eternity. It would make sense
to ask, "How long has he existed?," "Will He exist next
week?," "He was in existence yesterday but how about
today?," and so on. It seems absurd to make God the
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subject of such questions. 41
Malcolm insists that our ordinary conception of God, a
conception captured in Anselm's turn of phrase, is of a God
not merely of unlimited duration, but of God eternal and
necessarily eternal. Questions about God's supposed duration
do not suggest merely falsely that there could be a limit to
that duration. They do so meaninglessly. The suggestion that
God just happens to exist eternally is, he thinks, likewise
meaningless.
To Malcolm, all this means that no contingent existence
can be ascribed to God, that the existence of God is either
necessary or impossible, and he cites the following passage
from Anselm's response to Gaunilo to show that Anselm
agrees:
If indeed [that than which a greater cannot be thought]
can even be thought, it is necessary that it be. For no
one denying or doubting that there is something than
which a greater could not be thought denies or doubts
that, if there were (such a thing], it would not be
possible that it not be, either in deed or in the understanding. Therefore, if it can even be thought, it is
impossible for that than which a greater cannot be
thought not to be. 42
41

42

Ibid., 144.

Anselm, 131: "Si utique vel cogitari potest, necesse
est illud esse. Nullus enim negans aut dubitans esse aliquid
quo maius cogitari non possit, negat vet dubitat quia, si
esset, nee actu nee intellectu posset non esse. Aliter namque
non esset quo maius cogitari non posset. Sed quidquid cogitari
potest et non esse: si esset posset vel actu vel intellectu
non esse. Quare si vel cogitari potest, non potest non esse
"quo maius cogitari nequit".
Malcolm himself cites Deane's translation (St. Anselm:
Basic Writings, 154-5): "If it [the thing a greater than which
cannot be conceived] can be conceived at all it must exist.

36
Malcolm concludes that the only possible basis for rejecting
the existence of· God would be to argue that a being than
which none greater can be conceived is impossible. 43
He discusses the question of God's possibility, but his
main point is not an argument that God is, or must be,
possible. Instead, he argues that it would be wrong to ask
for such an argument. It would be, in his terms, to demand a
proof that the concept of a being than which none greater
can be conceived does not contradict itself, and he holds
that such a demand would be unreasonable. He explains:
With respect to any particular reasoning that is offered
for holding that the concept of seeing a material thing,
for example, is self-contradictory, one may try to show
the invalidity of the reasoning and thus free the concept from the charge of being self-contradictory on that
ground. But I do not understand what it would mean to
demonstrate in general, and not in respect to any particular reasoning, that the concept is not self-contradictory. So it is with the concept of God. I should
think there is no more of a presumption that it is selfcontradictory than is the concept of seeing a material
thing. 44
Malcolm speaks here of a "presumption." In the face of
the fact that many of us do speak of God with a sense that
For no one who denies or doubts the existence of a being a
greater than which in inconceivable, denies or doubts that if
it did exist its non-existence, either in reality or in the
understanding, would be impossible. For otherwise it would not
be a being a greater than which cannot be conceived. But as to
whatever can be conceived but does not exist: if it were to
exist its non-existence either in reality or in the understanding would be possible. Therefore, if a being a greater
than which cannot be conceived, can even be conceived, it must
exist."
43
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we are speaking of something real, we are right to assume
that God is possible. There is, he thinks, no particular
reason to assume that God cannot be rather than that God can
be. Those of us who speak of God can rightly be asked to
refute any particular argument that purports to show that
God is impossible. We cannot be expected, however, to do any
more than that.
Nevertheless, insofar as Malcolm's ordinary language
version of the ontological argument for the existence of God
can show, by itself, only that if God is possible, then God
must be, it cannot show us that God is without showing us
that. God can be. If Malcolm is right to say that there are
no general arguments for the possibility of a thing--or, as
he would say, the non-contradictory character of a concept-then there can, on his account, be no general argument that
God can be, and so is. We may feel a presumption one way or
the other, but a presumption is not a proof. To say this is
in no way to conclude that Malcolm's version of the argument
is invalid. Or even that it is weak. It is only to affirm
that the argument, even as he construes it, is limited.
Plantinga concludes as much in a rather different way.
He does not believe that there are conclusive general arguments for the existence or non-existence of God, but he
makes no general appeal to the way people speak. Instead, he
concludes that the belief that God exists can be "properly
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basic" for the individuals who hold it. 45 This is to say
that there are circumstances under which it is reasonable
for a given individual to hold that God exists, even if such
circumstances are at play only for that individual. He
writes, "There are therefore many conditions and circumstances that call forth belief in God: guilt, gratitude,
danger, a sense of God's presence, a sense that he speaks,
perception of various parts of the universe. " 46 Such circumstances might lead to certain beliefs--he points, for example, to a belief that one is guilty before God and a belief
that God is to be thanked. Though he must immediately admit
that it is these beliefs that are "properly basic," and not
the belief that God exists, he also adds that "each selfevidently entails that God exists. " 47
But this whole claim arises out of a conclusion that
general arguments for and against existence are inconclusive. To say that whether it is reasonable for someone to
believe in God depends on circumstances such as Plantinga
points to is to say that the argument between men such as
Malcolm and Findlay, who argues that God is impossible, 48
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may be no argument at all. If Malcolm has some reason, perhaps an experience, that leads him to think that God is it
is perfectly reasonable for him to believe it. In the absence of such evidence, Findlay is just as reasonable to
think otherwise. But neither has any basis from which to
refute the other's position. The two of them have little to
discuss at all.
Plantinga's account stands thus, in one sense, in sharp
contrast with Malcolm's. The latter attempts to enable us to
discuss God's possibility by investigating the way we ordinarily speak about God. Someone who would deny that God is
possible must accept the burden of undermining the presumption, grounded in the way we ordinarily speak, that God
might be. For Plantinga, such a discussion would be beside
the point. The basis on which the question of God's existence must be decided is a private one. I reflect upon my
own experience. I ask myself whether any experience I have
entails a properly basic belief that God exists.
Thus, if my account can serve as a representative sample
of the current attempts to defend the rigor of what is taken
to be Anselm's argument for the existence of God, I must
conclude that those attempts fall short of establishing that
God exists because they cannot show that God is possible.
This does not mean that they are invalid, or even that they
are weak, but that they are limited. Malcolm and Plantinga
each go outside of the argument to justify their different
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manners of concluding that God indeed exists. Malcolm turns
to the ordinary use of the word "God." Plantinga appeals to
private experience. By itself, the investigation of the
ontological argument may thus be a complex and interesting
road, but if it is to show that God exists, it also seems to
be a dead end. My question, then, must be whether this dead
end is Anselm's road as well.

CHAPTER 3
ANSELM'S ARGUMENT FROM EXPERIENCE

In the first chapter I argued that modern analytic
versions of Anselm's argument are not compelling proofs that
God exists. Both of the versions we considered require an
appeal to experience in order to ground the assumption,
otherwise open to question, that God is possible. In considering the versions of Malcolm and Plantinga, I paid little
attention to any question of fidelity to what Anselm himself
actually says. I did not ask whether the Proslogion includes
an ontological argument for God's existence. Instead I
focussed on the analyses of current versions of what has
come to be called the ontological argument. We must decide
whether my conclusions concerning those modern arguments are
valid for Anselm's position as well. I will argue that
insofar as analytic versions of the argument lead to an
appeal to experience, they are similar to the argument
Anselm himself makes. The difference, however, lies in the
character of the claim that Anselm's own argument strives to
make. It is not a claim about God's existence, but a claim
about God's being. The analytic debate about the ontological
argument for the existence of God comes to a dead end at the
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question of God's possibility, but Anselm's own argument is
another road entirely.
Some recent commentators have already rejected the
common assumption that Anselm offers an ontological argument
for the existence of God. We will have reason to consider
one such rejection, by Jean-Luc Marion, at some length in
Chapter 5. Thomas Losoncy, however, has also argued that
Anselm presents no such argument. He argues that it is
Gaunilo who formulates the ontological argument and that
Anselm explicitly rejects that formulation in his response
to Gaunilo. 1 Gregory Schufreider allows that Anselm's argument is ontological, but insists that it is less about the
fact of God's existence than about the manner of God's
existence. 2
One striking point is that although the current analytic
debate, and indeed much of the debate since Leibniz and even
Scotus, leads to the question of God's possibility, this
question is entirely absent from Anselm's book. This fact
has not struck all readers, and perhaps for good reason.
Analytic writers like Malcolm and Plantinga see the issue of
God's possibility in Anselm's various claims about conceivability. Plantinga, for example, writes that:
1

Thomas A. Losconcy, "Saint Anselm' s Rejection of the
'Ontological Argument'--A Review of the Occasion and Circumstances," The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 64
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2
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when Anselm defines "God" as "the being than which none
greater can be conceived," I think we can represent his
intent by replacing that phrase with "the being than
which it is not (logically) possible that there be a
greater" or "the greatest possible being." 3
And in a later book, he writes that when Anselm says, "that
a certain state of affairs is conceivable he means to say
(or so, at any rate, I shall take him) that it is a logically possible state of affairs." 4 It is only fair to add that
Plantinga notes that he is less interested in representing
Anselm's argument faithfully than in working out arguments
that Anselm's "words suggest." 5 Even if expressions like
"state of affairs" and "conceivable" are foreign to Anselm's
work, it would be enough for Plantinga if they express an
argument worth talking about. Plantinga cares about the
logic of a certain collection of claims, not about the
meaning of Anselm's words.
It is important for us to note that when Plantinga
writes of logical possibility, what he has in mind is the
absence of contradiction. In The Nature of Necessity, he
explains what he means by a "possible state of affairs" by
mentioning counter-examples:
So, for example, Kareem Abdul-Jabbar's being more than
seven feet tall is a state of affairs, as is Spiro
Aanew's beina President of Yale University. Although
each of these is a state of affairs, the former but not
3

Plantinga, God and Other Minds, 65.

4

Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity,
Univ. Press, 1974), 199.
5

Ibid., 199.
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the latter obtains, or is actual. And although the
latter is not actual, it is a possible state of affairs;
in this regard it differs from David's having travelled
faster than the speed of light and Paul's having squared
the circle. The former of these last two items is causally or naturally impossible; the latter is impossible
in that broadly logical sense. 6
Plantinga's example of something logically impossible is
the squaring of a circle, the self-contradictory effort to
find a square equal in area to a given circle. A logically
possible state of affairs is, presumably, one that entails
no such contradiction. Let us remember that we already saw
that Malcolm thinks of possibility in the same way. In order
to suggest that there can be no general proof that something
is possible, he writes that although he might be able to
refute any particular claim that a given concept is selfcontradictory, he does not "understand what it would mean to
demonstrate in general ••• that the concept is not self
contradictory." 7
Anselm could not, however, mean what Plantinga takes him
to mean. The issue for him is not whether a concept of God
contradicts itself. He does not speak of whether a state of
affairs is conceivable, much less whether one is logically
possible.

Anselm speaks of God as a being, not as a state

of affairs, than which nothing greater can be thought. And
this is not the same as saying that God is the greatest
logically possible being. When Anselm says that God is a
6

Ibid., 44.

7

Malcolm, 157.
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being than which nothing greater can be thought, he is
speaking both of the greatness of God and our power to
think. The evidence for this emerges in Chapter 15 of the
Proslogion. There, Anselm argues that God is not only that
than which a greater cannot be thought, or conceived, but
that God is "something greater than could be thought." 8
According to Plantinga's understanding, Anselm would here be
arguing that God is so great as not to be logically possi-

ble.
Now, in the first place, it is hard to imagine what it
would mean to say that logical impossibility should be a
feature of God's greatness. It might not be strange to say
that God's greatness is miraculous, but is "miraculous" even
a near synonym for "logically impossible?" In addition,
Anselm immediately goes on to argue that such a being can be
thought to be. Is it likely that he means it is logically
possible that there be a being that is logically impossible?
Let us, then, attempt to interpret Anselm's own argument. I will claim that it leads farther than the modern
debate about the ontological argument can. We can begin by
asking why the possibility of God's existence would not come
into question for Anselm. It might be tempting to think that
ignoring the question reflects a lack of rigor in Anselm's
thinking, but this is not the case. We can start to under-

8
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stand why Anselm would not have considered whether God is
possible by taking Anselm's original title for the work
seriously.
He reports that he first called the book "Faith Seeking
Understanding," 9 as if the title itself should emphasize
that the book is a search of and within faith for understanding--and not the search of a disinterested inquirer.
Anselm underscores this fact about the book at the end of
Chapter 1, where he insists that he does not seek to understand in order to believe, but rather believes in order to
understand, and he explains by adding, "For this too I
believe: that unless I believe, I shall not understand." 10
In fact, much of the first chapter reflects its author's
sense that the undertaking that is to follow depends upon
his relationship with God. He exhorts the little man who he
is to "be free for a little while for God and rest for a
little while in Him." 11 This is to say that he must attend,
for the moment, to God alone. He exhorts his own heart to
beseech God: "Speak now, all my heart, say now to God,

'I

9

Ibid., 94: " ••• nee tamen eadem sine aliquo titulo, quo
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seek Your face; Your face, Lord, I am searching for.' " 12
This suggests that it is not enough to attend to God. Anselm
must speak to God and ask for help. Anselm then addresses
God directly, "Then come You now, Lord my God, teach my
heart, where and how it might seek You, where and how it
might find You." 13 Each of these moments--and there are
others in the first chapter--reflects the role that Anselm's
faith, his relationship with God, plays from the very start
of the book • What is important to remember here is that for
Anselm to begin by confessing his belief in God is not
merely to report his acceptance of a body of statements
about God, among which is the claim that God exists.
Anselm's starting point is not the words of a dogma, but the
experience of a presence, God's presence.
The beginning of the book reflects this fact in many
ways, but the reflection does have one characteristic form:
throughout much of the beginning Anselm speaks directly to
God. God is not merely the subject of a discourse, but the
object of an address. After directing a few words to his own
soul, Anselm spends most of the first chapter asking God for
help and explaining to God why he needs it. The second
chapter, where the argument concerning God's being first

12

Ibid.: "Die nunc, totum cor meum, die nunc Deo: Quaero
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emerges, opens with yet more words addressed to God. Before
his analysis begins, Anselm briefly summarizes his plea for
help, "Therefore, Lord, who grants understanding to faith,
grant to me, as much as You know that it will profit, that I
understand that You are just as we believe and that You are
what we believe. " 14
The first thing to note is that Anselm considers his
request to be a consequence of the profession that precedes
it. The chapter's first word, "ergo" (therefore), marks it
as such. He has just written that he will not understand
without first believing. Because he believes that understanding can only follow faith, and that God is one who
grants the former to the latter, he must begin his search
for understanding by asking for it.
He directs this request to God. It is directed speech.
The chapter's second word is in the vocative case, the form
of direct address. The sentence's main verb, "grant" (da),
is a second person imperative. It may be tempting to assume
that Anselm must address God merely because he believes he
must ask for understanding. As such it would reflect
Anselm's need, but not necessarily any sense, on Anselm's
part, of the presence of one who might meet that need.
The assumption, however, would be false. The intimate
tone of the first chapter argues against this. In addition,
14

Anselm, 101: "Ergo Domine, qui das fidei intellectum,
da mihi, ut quantum scis expedire, intelligam, quia es sicut
credimus, et hoc es quod credimus."
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we should recognize that Anselm could ask for help without
addressing God directly. One way to see this is to compare
the beginning of the Proslogion with another work that both
aims at understanding the existence of God and also begins
in prayer: De primo principio, by John Duns Scotus.
Scotus begins, "May the First Principle of things grant
me to believe, to understand and to reveal what may please
his majesty and may lift up our minds to contemplate him. " 15
Scotus makes this request of what he calls "the first principle of things." He asks that the principle "allow"
(concedat) him "to believe, know, and present what might
please its majesty." He follows by asking that something be
revealed that will lift up "our minds" to contemplation.
This is just what Anselm at least claims to aim at as he
writes the Proslogion. He describes the persona in which the
Proslogion is written as that of

"on~

trying to lift up his

mind towards contemplating God. " 16
But if the similarity between Anselm's beginning and
that of Scotus is great, so is the difference. The third
person, jussive subjunctive that Scotus uses makes it clear

15
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that he does not address anyone in particular. He speaks of,
and not to, the one on whom his request depends. Whereas
Anselm speaks to the God from whom he hopes for assistance,
Scotus speaks only of the first principle and of our minds.
Anselm, then, need not address God simply because his
hope depends on God. He speaks to God because God is there
for him to speak to--felt as present before an argument for
God's existence is made--and he speaks to God because God's
presence is fundamental to the analysis that follows his
first words. In order to understand his analysis, one must
understand the role God's presence plays in it.
In the sentence that follows Anselm's request for help,
the sentence with which Anselm's analysis of God's being
begins, he only confirms that the analysis requires the
presence of God at the very start. Like the words that
precede them, the words with which Anselm articulates what
has been called his "definition" of God are also addressed
to God. Anselm writes, "And indeed we believe You to be
something than which nothing greater could be thought. " 17
Here again, we see Anselm's reliance on God reflected in two
ways: on one hand, he affirms that the analysis is about
what he--or, as he says, what we--believe; on the other
hand, it is a belief expressed to God, who is there.
Anselm concludes his first analysis of the being of God

17
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midway through Chapter Three, "Therefore, so truly is there
something than which a greater cannot be thought that it
could not even be thought not to be. " 18 He adds: "And this
is You, Lord our God." And he goes on to explain the conclusion he has reached in a manner that shows the same two
aspects. He addresses it to God, whom he has spoken of, and
he explains it in terms of what he believes about God:
Therefore, You are so truly, Lord my God, that You could
not even be thought not to be. And rightly. For if any
mind could think something better than You, the creature
would ascend above the creator and would pronounce
judgment on the creator; which is very absurd. 19
Anselm re-affirms, by use of the second person, the connection between his analysis and the presence of God, and he
explains his conclusion in terms of a belief about God that
is not

expressed~-though

it might be implied--by the state-

ment to and about God that begins the analysis: Anselm
refers to God as the creator. If it were Anselm's intention
to prove the existence of God by reason alone, without
reference to the beliefs about God that he starts with, this
explanation would make no sense whatsoever. By referring to
God, at this point, as the creator, Anselm goes beyond any
set of premises that the ontological argument would start
with, and he does so gratuitously, since the argument has
18
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presumably been made before the return to the second person
singular that begins this passage.
The character of the first chapter, of the beginning of
the second, and of the middle of the third suggests an
explanation for the fact the Anselm does not discuss the
question of God's possibility: he need not do so because he
experiences the presence of the God whom he seeks to understand. Such an experience is just the sort of circumstance
that Plantinga has in mind when he speaks of circumstances
that entail a properly basic belief, and in this respect it
may appear to be similar to his approach. The two appeals to
experience are, however, quite different. Plantinga appeals,
as a final step, to the possibility that an experience can
justify a belief as properly basic in order to preserve the
claim that the ontological argument can be valid. Anselm,
however, does not appeal to experience at the end of his
argument. For him, experience is where the argument begins.
There is no moment, at the conclusion of the argument, at
which Anselm must admit that it depends upon a decisive
appeal to experience, because his experience of God moves
the argument right from the start.
We should, however, at least consider the possibility
that I am making too much of the words in which Anselm
imbeds his argument. After all, Schmitt gives us serious
reasons to think that the composition of the Proslogion as a
prayer is window dressing that was added after the heart of
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the work was conceived. It is important to face his position.
Schmitt shows that there are clear differences between
the passages in which Anselm argues and those in which he
does not. It is, however, important to notice that this
hardly bears at all on the way of understanding the
Proslogion that I would suggest. Schmitt's point seems aimed
at refuting the attempt to deny that the Proslogion is an
argument at all. This is not my position. Even if I grant
Schmitt that the argumentative sections of the Proslogion
are the core that Anselm only later clothed as prayer, I can
still insist that Anselm's analysis depends on the fact that
he feels God to be present to him.
But it is also possible to say more about Schmitt's
position. Schmitt concludes that Anselm aims only at the
speculative task of reducing the reasoning in the Monologion
to a single argument, and that the composition of the work
as an address is mere style. Even so, he must somehow explain the style of the work. He might claim that the book's
composition is incidental to it, but the book is at least
composed as an address. Fully aware of this, Schmitt asks
why Anselm might have chosen this particular form, and
answers that the Monologion was composed as a discourse and
that, in order to vary his style, Anselm set the Proslogion
as an address. But Schmitt does not ask why Anselm might
have wanted to vary his style: he only asks--and this only
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rhetorically--whether any other variation in style would
have been more likely. 20 Nor does he explain why the style
Anselm settled on was that of an address to God, though
Anselm wrote dialogues and letters as well. For some reason,
Anselm chose to compose the Proslogion as an address to God.
One ought to try to understand this fact. To say that this
was out of a desire for what we might today call a "change
of pace" is to refuse to take what might be a decisive
question seriously at all.
To see that the presence of God, which is affirmed by
the composition of the work as a prayer, bears strongly on
the nature of the analysis is to make a beginning. The
possibility that God exists is established for Anselm by the
fact that he experiences God. This is not to say that Anselm
deduces that God is possible from his experience, but that,
because of his experience, the question of God's possibility
is not a question for him. Anselm's analysis is, then, an
argument from experience. To explore this claim requires
considering the two notions on which the analysis depends.
We must ask what the verbs "to think" (cogitare) and "to
understand" (intelligere) express.
When Anselm writes of something than which none greater
can be thought, what does "thought" (cogitari) mean? The
only gesture Anselm makes towards defining the word is by

20
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way of a metaphor. This he does in the fourth chapter,
immediately after he has argued in the third that God cannot
be thought not to be. Referring back to a psalm that he has
already quoted, Anselm asks, "How then did [the fool] say in
his heart what he could not think, or how could he not think
what he said in his heart, when to say in the heart and to
think are the same? " 21 He explains that something can be
thought in two ways, "For a thing is thought in one sense,
when the word signifying it is thought [and], in another,
when that itself, which the thing is; is understood." 22
Anselm points to the second meaning as the important one,
emphasizing that "No one indeed, understanding what God is,
can think that God is not, although he might say these words
in his heart. " 23 It is this meaning, then, that must guide
the attempt to understand what he means by "that than which
none greater can be thought." Such a being is one than which
none greater can be spoken of in our hearts with understand-
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ing. 24
But this explanation forces one to ask what Anselm means
by "understanding" (intellectus) and "understand" (intelligere). It is more difficult to talk about these words. Let
me say at least provisionally that the understanding is a
kind of vision or is somehow like vision. To do so is to
respond, once again, to a metaphor Anselm uses. For though
he speaks of his desire to understand God, he also speaks,
quoting another psalm, of a desire to see God's face: "I
seek Your face;

[it is] Your face, Lord, I am searching

for. " 25 The metaphor suggests that to understand something
is to see it as what it is, that understanding is insight.
I will later point out that as noted an authority as
Karl Barth takes the word in a very different sense, but for
now let me confirm that this initial understanding of understanding corresponds to Anselm's own use by turning to his
Chapter 18. There, he goes farther in the suggestion that
the activity of understanding is a kind of vision. I cited
the decisive passage in my introduction, 26 and I shall cite
it later as well, but let me also do so here. After having
enumerated qualities that are God, and having summarized
24
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them all by saying that God is "every true good," Anselm
writes that the qualities "are many," and he adds, "my
narrow understanding cannot see so many in one simultaneous
insight in order to delight in all of them at once." 27
Anselm thus thinks of understanding as a power that sees--or
fails to see--wholes at once.
When, therefore, Anselm identifies God as something than
which nothing greater can be thought, he means that God is
something than which nothing greater can be spoken of in
one's heart in a manner that enables one to see it. And when
he begins his argument by claiming that God is at least in
the understanding, he must mean that when he tells the fool
what God is, the fool sees, in some sense, what Anselm is
talking about. The fool is not an atheist, if to be an
atheist requires the denial that God is even possible. The
fool cannot do so: Anselm's claim that the fool understands
the words with which Anselm expresses what he believes God
to be requires that the fool sees, or experiences, the
"thing" (res) those words describe--perhaps very much as
Anselm does.
If, then, Anselm's fool is--despite what Flasch would
claim--no atheist, who is this fool? Several points are
worth noticing. First, let us consider where Anselm finds
the fool. It is in the thirteenth psalm. The psalmist begins
27
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by proclaiming the line that Anselm quotes:
The fool hath said in his heart: There is no God.
They are corrupt, and are become abominable in their
ways: there is none that doth good, no not one.
The Lord looked down from heaven upon the children
of men, to see if there be any that understand and seek
God.
They are all gone aside, they are become unprofitable together: there is none that doeth good, no not
one. 28
These first three verses affirm the connection between
the denial that God is and wrongdoing. The fool of whom the
psalmist sings says in his heart that there is no God, and,
as a result, is corrupt and has become abominable. At the
same time, the psalmist also says what the fool is not. The
fool is not one who "did understand, and seek God."
At this point it is worth remembering how Anselm describes the persona he adopts for the Prosloqion. It is
written, he says, "under the persona of one trying to lift
up his mind in order to contemplate God and seeking to
understand what he believes. " 29 As such, it seems written
with the fool of the psalm in mind. The Proslogion persona
strives precisely to direct his thoughts towards contemplat28
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ing God, and seeks in doing so to understand what he believes. This would be to understand God, an understanding
denied, according to the psalmist, to the foolish children
of men.
But to say that the Proslogion is directed against such
a fool is not enough. When Anselm says that the persona he
will assume is of one who seeks to lift the mind to the contemplation of God, he does not mean someone else's mind, but
his own (mentem suam). In other words, Anselm's fool is a
fool within, some part of the author that says in his heart
that there is no God.
This is not to say that some part of Anselm doubts the
existence of God. One way to see this is to consider a
passage in another psalm, a passage echoed in the reference
to the fool in Psalm 13. In the ninth psalm, the psalmist
writes that:
The sinner has provoked the Lord: according to the
throng of his anger he does not seek.
God is not in his sight ••• 30
Jerome's placing of "non est" in the emphatic first position

30
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in the Vulgate argues that God is entirely absent from the
wicked man's sight. The wicked man fails to see God at all.
God is not present to him.
But this is not the case with the fool--neither Anselm's
fool nor the fool of the psalm. God is present in the fool's
thoughts. The fool is a fool because he denies the existence
of God even though God is present to him. Anselm uses this
presence almost right away as his analysis proceeds: this
much I have already argued. The wicked man of the ninth
psalm, on the other hand, does not deny that God exists. He
does not think of God at all.
Anselm's fool, the fool who dwells in Anselm, then, does
not doubt, but willfully denies, that God exists. The end of
the fourth chapter confirms this, where Anselm thanks God
for an illumination in the light of which he could not fail
to understand that God is even if he did not want to, or
wished not to, believe it:
I thank You, good Lord, I thank You, because what I
previously believed because You granted [it], I now so
understand because You shed light (on it] that (even] if
I were unwilling to believe that You are, I would not be
able not to understand [that You are.] 31
Here it is clear not only that the fool's denial that God is
reflects what the fool wants to think, and not what the fool
in fact believes, but also that, when Anselm considers the
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Anselm, 104: "Gratias tibi, bone Domine, gratias tibi,
quia quod prius credidi te donante, iam sic intelligo te
illuminante, ut, si te esse nolim credere, non possim non
intelligere."
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possibility of a willful denial, he has himself in mind.
This contradicts Flasch directly. He claims that
Anselm's fool is an atheist indeed. His argument depends on
his understanding of the position that Anselm intends to use
his analysis to undermine. According to Flasch, Anselm would
refute the "denial of the existence of a being beyond which
a more perfect cannot be thought." 32 This is surely true in
a sense, but the denial in question is an odd one: it is not
that of someone who believes his own words. Anselm's fool
wants to deny the existence of a God whom he himself, in
some sense, sees. Anselm's reference, in Chapter 3, to God
as creator only makes this fact clearer and more dramatic.
Anselm does not just assume, as Flasch argues, a shared
vision of the being who is something than which a greater
cannot be thought, he assumes that the vision includes a
belief that this being is the Creator.
But Flasch has other evidence as well. He points especially to the character of Anselm's answer to Gaunilo's
Reply on Behalf of the Fool. Gaunilo seems to take the first
chapters of the Proslogion as an attempt to prove that God
exists, and he argues that they fail. Flasch notices that
Anselm responds to Gaunilo point by point, rather than by
explaining that Gaunilo has mistaken his intent. But it is
important to consider just how Anselm actually responds to
32

Flasch, 7: "die Bestreitung der Existenz eines Wesens,
iiber das hinaus Vollkommeneres nicht gedacht werden kann." The
emphasis is Flasch's.
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Gaunilo. In the beginning of his answer, he reminds Gaunilo
first of all where their discussion must begin. Against
Gaunilo's claim that "that than which ••• " is neither understood nor thought, Anselm writes, "I use your faith and your
conscience as my most solid argument. " 33

If Anselm' s book

is in any sense an argument for God's existence, it is one
that depends, at least in his own view, on the experience of
faith.
This response by Anselm is important in two ways. First,
it confirms the claim that his argument begins with a belief
in God. Second, it speaks to the important role that belief
plays: it is the belief that guarantees that the words with
which Anselm points to God--"that than which ••• "--are in
fact understood. The proof, of course, depends on both
sides' agreeing that such a being is, at least, in the
understanding, and this agreement flows from a matter of
faith. If my understanding of "understanding" is correct,
then this is what understanding the words "something than
which none greater can be thought" requires.
Flasch knows perfectly well that this is Anselm's first
answer to Gaunilo. He even points out that Anselm's purpose
is merely to insist that Anselm and Gaunilo share the very
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Anselm, 130: "Si 'quo maius cogitari non potest' non
intelligitur vel cogitatur nee est in intellectu vel
cogitatione: profecto Deus aut non est quo maius cogitari non
possit, aut non intelligitur vel cogitatur et in intellectu
vel cogitatione. Quod falsum sit, fide et conscientia tua pro
firmissimo utor argumento."
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same understanding that Anselm shares with the fool:
When Anselm inakes mention, in his. answer, of Ga uni lo' s
Christian belief, then [he does so], strictly speaking,
only in the context [of his claim] that the content of
his formula exists in the understanding of a believer
(like Gaunilo) at least just as much as in the understanding of an unbeliever who enters into Anselm's
discussion--even if, as in the case of an atheist, [it
exists] without any positing of [the being's] existence
[in fact] • 34
But if Anselm really thinks that the shared understanding in
question could be independent of belief, then he would not
need to appeal to Gaunilo's faith. He could merely remind
Gaunilo that, when one hears the words "that than which a
greater cannot be thought," one understands what one hears.
Gaunilo's response to Anselm was, in part, to deny it to
be certain that he has such a being in his understanding any
differently than he has "any false things and things that
exist in themselves in no way at all. " 35

And here is where

Flasch's understanding of the debate seems most peculiar. He
suggests that it is Anselm's intention to refute Gaunilo by
pointing out that, because Gaunilo believes, God is in his
understanding just as God is in the understanding of a
34

Flasch, 18: "Wenn Anselm in seiner Antwort ( §1) an den
christlichen Glauben Gaunilo's erinnert, dann strikt nur in
dem Zusammenhang, dafi der Inhalt seiner Beweisformel im
Verstand eines Glaubigen (wie Gaunilo) zumindest ebenso
existiert wie im Verstand eines in Anselms Diskussion
eintretenden Unglaubigen;
eventuell noch,
wie bei dem
Atheisten, ohne Existenzbehauptung."
35

Ga uni lo, Quid ad haec respondeat guidam pro insipiente,
in Anselm, Opera Omnia, 125: "Nonne et quaecumque falsa ac
nullo prorsus modo existentia in intellectu habere similiter
dici possem, cum ea, dicente aliquo, quaecumque ille diceret,
ego intelligerem?"
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supposed atheist. But if this were so, the response would be
no response at all. Anselm himself recognized, in his account of the fool's ability to think that there is no God,
that the fool is able to think through words without any
reference to the thing (res) the words refer to. Though his
response to Gaunilo might work for one who has faith, it
would not answer an atheist. Anselm's argument need not
prevent someone who does not believe from denying that an
understanding of God as that than which a greater cannot be
thought is possible in just this way. The fool, if he is an
atheist, can respond to Anselm that he can think through
what Anselm says, but add that this does not mean that God
is in his thought.
On the other hand, the appeal to Gaunilo's faith shows
clearly something about the fool that is less explicit in
the Proslogion itself: that the fool is, as I have already
argued for other reasons, one who believes in God. 36 It
would, as such, be Anselm's attempt to let Gaunilo and his
other readers know all the more clearly where the argument
begins: namely, with the experience of God, present to the

36

The first words of Anselm's response to Gaunilo only
seem to deny this. He writes:
Quoniam non me reprehendit in his dictis ille insipiens,
contra quern sum locutus in meo opusculo, sed quidam non
insipiens et catholicus pro insipiens: suf f icere mihi
potest respondere catholico. (Anselm, 130)
But he hardly could have insisted, in a polite exchange, that
he was still arguing with a fool. Though he can speak about a
part of himself as foolish, it would not do to say the same
about Gaunilo.
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understanding when those words that express what, as Anselm
says, "we believe" about God are spoken.
The end of the second chapter of the Proslogion confirms
this claim. There, Anselm sums up the first argument concerning God's being with a two-fold conclusion: "There
exists, therefore, beyond doubt, something than which a
greater cannot be thought both in the understanding and in
fact. " 37 This conclusion, which is one of very few occurrences in the book of the verb "to exist" (existere), affirms that there is a connection between the claim that God
exists in fact and the claim that God exists in the understanding, and this latter depends, as Anselm's use of the
word "understanding" suggests, on an experience of God.
Anselm's argument for the existence of God is, then, an
argument from experience. He begins it from an understanding
of the God that he strives to understand. But this claim is
a strange one. It would appear that we have found an argument for the existence of God that depends on an experience
of God as existent. If God is experienced as existing, why
would one need to prove that God exists? This is the question that will set the inquiry of the next chapter into
motion.

37

Ibid., 102: "Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid quo
maius cogitari non valet, et in intellectu et in re."

CHAPTER 4
UNDERSTANDING WHAT WE BELIEVE
We should now try to understand what sense it makes for
Anselm to argue for something he already believes. One could
claim, on one hand, that the proof is directed by one who
has had and understood an experience of God's presence to
those who doubt God's existence. But this is not the case:
the proof cannot be conclusive without appealing to experience, and it is in fact directed at those who have experienced the presence of God. The former conclusion emerged
from the discussion of possibility, and the latter from the
understanding of Anselm's fool.
One could claim, on the other hand, that precisely those
who have experienced God's presence might need the reassurance that comes with proof. But here too there are difficulties. In the first place, Anselm declares that he does not
attempt to understand in order to believe. He is most explicit on this point: that he believes in order to understand. The purpose of the proof is not, in other words, to
confirm his faith. In the second place, Anselm does not
infer that he is God's creature, but assumes it. He explains
in the third chapter that it is impossible to think that God
is not, and he does so by arguing that no mind could think
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anything better than God because this would require that
"the creature ascend above the creator." 1

Though Anselm

goes on to argue that God is the being that all things need
in order to be, this argument comes after he appeals to
God's being the creator, a claim he takes as an evident
fact.
Several authors in this century have indeed claimed, as
I do, that Anselm's analysis in the Proslogion depends on
his faith. The most important of these accounts was offered
by Karl Barth. We can begin anew by considering it. He looks
at only the second and third chapters of Anselm's book--the
analyses that concern God's being. Generally speaking, Barth
takes these analyses to be arguments for the existence of
God, but arguments of a strange sort: they are, he thinks,
part of a theological algebra, one in which certain points
of faith are assumed in order that others might be proven.
Barth writes:
This Existence of God which is accepted in faith is now
to be recognized and proved on the presupposition of the
Name of God likewise accepted in faith and is to be
understood as necessary for thought.
And Barth goes on to affirm that an algebra is quite literally what he means:
Thus here the Name of God is the "!!" taken from the
Credo by means of which the Existence of God now repre-

1

Anselm, 103: "Si enim aliqua mens posset cogitare
aliquid melius te, ascenderet creatura super creatorem et
judicaret de creatore; quad valde est absurdum."
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sented as X is to be tra~sformed into a known quantity
from one that is unknown (not disbelieved but as yet not
realized) ••• 2
According to Barth, Anselm begins his argument by assuming one of two "known quantities" as given in order to
establish the logical connection between the two. What sense
does Barth make of such a logic? His account depends on his
understanding of Anselm's use of "understanding" and of
Anselm's view of the relationship between understanding and
faith.
Barth explains Anselm's understanding of understanding
by considering the etymology of the word, "intellectus,"
that Anselm uses. To understand is to reckon or to gather
inwardly:
In explaining Anselm's use of "intelligere" it is vitally important. to remember the literal meaning of the
word: intus legere. After all that has been said, there
can be no question but that the fundamental meaning of
intelligere is legere: to reflect upon what has already
been said in the Credo. 3
Why does faith seek this reflection? Barth does point
out that understanding brings with it both proof and rejoicing, but it is important to see that, for Barth, this question is not well posed. Faith does not seek understanding as
though this were a task over and above its primary task,
which is to believe? Seeking to understand a Credo is part
2

Karl Barth, Fides Quaerens Intellectum, trans. Ian W.
Robertson, (London: SCM Press, 1960; reprint, Mars , PA:
Pickwick Publications, Pittsburg Reprint Series, 1985), 78
(page references are to reprint edition).
3

Ibid., 40.
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of what faith is. Barth argues that the understanding that
concerns Anselm is one "desired by faith," and explains:
What we are speaking of is a spontaneous desire of
faith. Fundamentally, the quaerere intellectum is really
immanent in fides. Therefore it is not a question of
faith "requiring" the "proof" or the "joy." There is
absolutely no question at all of a requirement of faith.
Anselm wants "proof" and "joy" because he wants
intelligere and he wants intelligere because he believes. 4
In Barth's view, then, faith seeks understanding because
it is faith. The understanding it seeks is a reflection on,
or a gathering together of, articles of faith. It proceeds
by the assumption of one article in order to explore the
rational character of its relation to others. Barth argues
that Anselm reflects upon the existence of God in the first
few chapters of the Proslogion, and that, in the rest of the
Proslogion, Anselm reflects upon the nature of God. In each
case, Anselm sets what he would like to reflect upon as an
unknown, to be explored by the assumption of something else.
This something else is Anselm's phrase "that than which a
greater cannot be thought," and Barth calls the phase a
"Name" of God. Anselm, he says, assumes this "Name," and, on
the basis of its assumption, proves what he believes--neither as a means of affirming, or strengthening, his belief,
nor of converting others to his belief, but as a means of
reflecting upon, or understanding, that belief.
The first thing to notice about Barth's account is the

4

Ibid.

I
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sense in which it agrees with those previously considered.
Barth, no less than the analytic writers, views the analyses
of the second and third chapters as attempts to prove that
God exists. He differs only in his account of what we might
call the intent of that proof: rather than viewing it as a
polemical attempt to affirm something on rational grounds
alone, he views it as an attempt to reflect upon faith. Even
for him, though,·what is at issue is the existence of God.
Let me say here, by way of anticipation, that there is
reason to question even this--that is, whether the analyses
of the two chapters concern the existence of God.
The second thing to notice is that, according to Barth,
Anselm's analyses proceed from no more than the assumption
of the "Name" of God. I have argued, however, that, if they
are construed as polemical arguments, they depend on much
more. Insofar as Anselm would prove that God exists, he must
assume more than merely the "Name" of God. Not only must the
statement, "God is something than which none greater can be
conceived," be an unproven premise to the argument, but the
possibility of such a being must also be granted from the
start. Anselm can take God's possibility for granted because
he starts from an experience that affirms that God exists.
In other words, if Anselm were to "bracket" the existence of
God, or treat it as an unknown

X,

his argument would be

circular. His proof of God's existence would assume the
existence of God.
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There is yet a third matter to note about Barth's position, specifically about his understanding of Anselm's
understanding. Barth defines it, by appeal to etymology, as
an inward, or inner, reckoning (intus legere). "Legere"
means, first of all, "to bring together, gather, collect."
It can also mean "to read." 5 Barth's claim, then, is that,
for Anselm, to understand is to collect discrete elements
inwardly. This jibes well with Barth's claim that Anselm
sets out to prove God's existence in order to see its connection to other elements of what he believes. But in explaining "understanding" in this way, Barth cites no passages from the Proslogion or from Anselm's other works. He pays
almost no attention to Anselm's use of "thinking"
(cogitare), and he ignores the textual evidence that can be
brought to bear on the attempt to see through Anselm's use
of "understanding."
I have already considered this evidence. I argued that
understanding is, for Anselm, less a gathering-within than
it is a vision. Such a vision may of course depend on a
gathering-within that precedes it. One might have to collect
disparate elements, gather them into a whole, in order to
have some one thing for the understanding to see. But this
only points back to the fact that Barth does not discuss
Anselm's understanding of thought. Anselm describes thought,

5

C. T. Lewis, Intermediate Latin Dictionary,
Oxford University Press, 1993), s.v. "lego."
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as we have seen, by an appeal to a metaphor: thinking is
saying in the heart. Such inward speech is what Barth means
by understanding. A faithful account of the Proslogion must
distinguish faith, thinking, and understanding, and show the
connections among them. Barth uses the third of these in
place of the second, and cannot reserve for the understanding its proper place.
It is, then, necessary to look more deeply if one is to
understand the goal of Anselm's analysis. I will bring a
range of considerations to bear. Taken together, these
considerations will suggest that what have been taken so far
as proofs, of whatever sort, of the existence of God make
more sense as parts of an exploration of what, as Anselm
says, "we" believe God to be. On such an understanding, the
analysis appears to concern less the question of God's
existence than the manner of God's being.
We can look for the purpose of the analysis by considering more exactly what Anselm claims he will prove. Anselm
uses the same phrase in the various places where he appears
to claim that he will show that God exists. For example, the
second chapter of the Proslogion claims to show that "God
truly is." 6 I have thus far assumed that "God truly is" is
simply a synonym for "God exists." It is partly on this

6

Anselm, 101. The title of the chapter is: "Quod vere
sit deus." See also the preface, where Anselm says that he
seeks an argument to show, among other things, that God "truly
is" (Deus vere est).
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basis that I began by assuming that Anselm sets out to prove
God's existence. The two standard translations of the
Proslogion into English confirm this reading. M.J.
Charlesworth renders Anselm's "Deus vere est," as "God truly
exists." 7 S.N. Deane offers, "Truly there is a God." 8 Each
treats the word "truly" (vere) as though they think it
merely intensifies a claim that God exists, without bearing
on the claim's meaning essentially.
A German theologian, Anselm Stolz, however, argues for
another understanding of "vere est." He claims that the
phrase is a technical term taken from Augustine. The distinction the phrase points to is not between existence and
non-existence. It is, instead, between a certain form of
being, true being, and any other form of being. Stolz writes
that when Anselm attributes "vere esse" to God, he means
that God possesses a wholly unique type of being. He explains that God is not subject to alteration like earthly
things and that God did not pass from non-being to being.
Stolz concludes that to say that God "truly is" means that
"his being is not touched in any way by non-being, that the
concept of being applies, in its ultimate and true sense, to

St. Anselm's Proslogion, trans. and intro. M. J.
Charlesworth, (Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1979),
117.
8

St. Anselm: Basic Writings, intro. Charles Hartshorne
and trans. S. N. Deane, (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1962), 7.

74
him alone. " 9
The account of Stolz runs directly contrary to Barth's
account of the same expression. Like the analytic writers,
Barth takes Anselm's analysis to be an argument for the
existence of God. He argues that the conclusion of Chapter 2
explains its chapter heading. The heading reads, "that truly
God is," and the· chapter concludes, "there exists, therefore, beyond doubt something than which a greater cannot be
thought, both in the understanding and in fact. " 10 Barth
takes this to imply that to say that "God truly is" means
that God exists, and exists not just in the understanding
but in fact as well. 11
There are, however, two indications that the aim of

9

Anselm Stolz, Anselm von Canterbury, (Mlinchen: Verlag
K6sel-Pustet, 1937), 17: "Gegen die erste laflt sich geltend
machen, daB der Ausdruck 'vere esse' als Fachausdruck dem hl.
Augustinus gelauf ig war. Er bedeutet bei ihm aber nicht
'wirklich dasein' im Gegensatz zu 'nicht-sein', der Ton liegt
vielmehr auf dem vere, und wenn Gott das 'vere esse'
zugeschrieben wird, ist damit gesagt, daB Gott eine ganz
besondere Art von sein besitzt, d. h. er ist nicht wandelbar
wie die irdische Dinge, er ist nicht aus dem Nichtsein zum
Sein libergegangen, er ist nicht heute so und morgen anders,
sondern er bleibt sich irnrner gleich und verwirklicht in sich
absolute Seinsflille. Er 'ist wirklich' (vere est), d. h. sein
Sein ist in keiner Weise vom Nichtsein berilhrt, ihm allein
komrnt der Begrif f des Seins im eigentlichen und wahren Sinn
ZUo
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Anselm, 102: "Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid quo
maius cogitari non valet, et intellectu et in re."
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It is worth noting that Barth's account does not aim
at excluding the point Stolz makes--that "true" being means
the being unique to God--but to insist that, even if that
point is granted, esse still means existere. See: Barth, 100.
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Anselm's discussion of God's being is rather, just as Stolz
says, to attribute to God a very special manner of being.
One is the attention Anselm pays to just the qualities that
Stolz identifies as belonging to "true being": both the
latter part of the first half of the work (Chapter 13) and
the middle part of the second half (Chapter 18-21) deal with
the distinctions between how God and how created beings are
with respect to time and space.
But perhaps the strongest indication that the discussion
of God's being is an effort to attribute to God a particular
manner of being is in the third chapter. Anselm sets out to
show, in the second, that God truly is. And he turns in the
third to argue that God is "so truly that He cannot even be
thought not to be. " 12 Analytical writers like Malcolm and
others take this chapter as a distinct argument for the very
same claim that they take Anselm to make in Chapter 2, and
they do so even if they add that, as Malcolm puts it, "there
are two different pieces of reasoning which (Anselm] did not
distinguish from one another. " 13 But Anselm does distinguish
the two analyses by distinguishing the conclusions that they
aim at. Each is, it is true, an argument that God "truly
is." But while the one affirms that God indeed truly is; the
other adds that God is so truly that "he cannot even be
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Ibid., 102: "Quod utique sic vere est, ut nee cogitari
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The Ontological Argument, 136.
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thought not to be." This latter claim could, of course,
refer only to the manner of God's being. After all, whether
or not a thing can be thought as not being does not necessarily bear on whether that thing exists. In addition,
Anselm's formulation requires that a thing could be more or
less truly. It hardly makes sense to talk of the degree to
which God is if all that is at stake is whether God is--that
is, if what is at stake is God's existence considered only
as a bare fact.
Anselm's argument in Chapter 3 argues directly against
Barth's position that esse means existere, even if it is
also central to Anselm's position to show that God's being-or, as Barth would say, existence--is unique. It makes sense
to see Anselm's claim, that God is so truly, as an emphatic
affirmation of what Stolz understands him to say--that God's
being is untouched by non-being and this so much that God
cannot even be thought not to be--that God cannot even be
touched by non-being in our thought. But it makes no sense
to understand the point of Chapter 3 to be to show that God
exists, which was purportedly shown already in Chapter 2,
and even more so.
Barth himself recognizes this problem. He begins his
account of Chapter 3 by claiming that it concerns a different sense of "true being" than Chapter 2. He affirms that,
in the second chapter, "true being" means, as he has already
claimed, "being in the understanding and in thought." But he
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concedes that it means, as the third chapter concludes, that
God is such as cannot be thought not to be. 14
Anselm, however, makes no such distinction. He presents
the two chapters as though they were two analyses pointing
to claims that differ in degree but not in kind--namely,
that God truly is and that God is so truly that God cannot
be thought not to be. In the first case, Anselm shows that
God's being is such that God's being both in the understanding and in fact follows from our understanding of what we
believe God to be: Anselm cannot understand what he believes
with6ut understanding that God is. In the second case,
Anselm shows that God's being is such that God cannot even
be thought not to be. If Barth were right, it would have
made sense for Anselm to have distinguished the two senses
of "being" by using two different words. And it cannot be
argued that Anselm had no such words, for Barth himself
points out that Anselm uses "existere" at the end of Chapter

2.
Both indications suggest that when Anselm writes of
God's being, what he is interested in is not to show that
God is, but to understand in what manner--that is, how very
truly--God is. Anselm argues that God, and God alone, truly
is. Gregory Schufreider's recent book confirms this claim.
This may not appear to be so right away, because Schufreider
generally speaks of God's existence rather than of God's
14

See Barth, 132.
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being. He nonetheless insists that it is not the fact that
God exists but the unique manner in which God exists that is
at issue for Anselm, and does so by showing how the question
is rooted in arguments Anselm makes in the Monologion. 15
It is important to keep in mind, however, that this does
not say much about what it means to say that God truly is.
All that is certain at this point is that it means that
there is no sense in which God is not. The non-being of God
has no place in the understanding, no place in fact, and no
place in thought. All I have claimed thus far is that
Anselm's two analyses are not so much proofs that God exists--polemical or otherwise--but rather explorations of the
character of God's being.
In order now to see more of what it means to say that
God truly is we need to ask why Anselm argues that God truly
is. It is necessary to ask what role such an argument could
have in the Proslogion. We can begin by focussing on two
aspects of Anselm's work: on the fact that the analyses
concerning God's being are just two of several analyses that
Anselm undertakes and on Anselm's use of the verb "to understand". I will argue that the analyses begin to make sense
when seen in the context of a larger effort to see all of
his beliefs concerning what he calls "divine substance"
(divina substantia) and to see them as a whole.
That the whole range of analyses in the Proslogion
15

Schufreider, 113-177.
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concerns more that just the existence of God can not be
denied--even by those who take the two first analyses as
arguments for the existence of God, and even if they understand each of the others as aimed at proving some other
particular claim. No matter how fiercely anyone insists that
the first two chapters aim only to show that God exists, he
or she must still admit that the Proslogion includes, in
addition to these, other analyses directed at rather different claims. Through the first half of the book, Anselm sets
out a series of analyses that address various beliefs that
he holds. After the chapters concerning God's being, he
turns to other aspects of what he believes. He argues that
God is "whatever it is better to be than not to be," that
God is the creator who, as the only one of all things that
exists "through itself" (existens per seipsum), made all
other things from nothing. And he goes on to treat of God's
sensitivity, incorporeality, omnipotence, mercy, impassiveness, justice, and of God's relationship to all these qualities. It is important to consider how these various analyses
work together. Their breadth reflects Anselm's most general
statement of what the Proslogion is about. In the first
paragraph of the preface, he writes:
I began to seek with myself, whether perhaps one argument could be found that would need none other than
itself alone to test itself and alone would suffice to
affirm that God truly is and is the highest good, needing none other, which all things·require in order to be
and to be well and whatever we believe concerning divine
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substance. 16
Anselm thus sets himself one task: to affirm
(astruendum) a series of beliefs about God, only one of
which is that God truly is. It is not clear, however, what
he means by "to affirm." This word is a key to understanding
what Anselm hopes his argument will enable him to do. I have
already pointed out reasons for thinking that the word could
not, in the context in which Anselm uses it, mean "to
prove." But to say what the word does not mean is not to
explain what it does mean. It is not to look at the word
directly at all.
It is important to determine first whether the word even
admits of any other interpretation. The standard translations suggest that it does not. Deane has "to demonstrate" 17
and Charlesworth has "to prove. " 18 Even Schufreider uses "to
demonstrate. " 19 I will consider the word at some length because it is at the core of the lines I have just cited,
which are the only explanation Anselm gives in the
Proslogion of the analyses the book includes. To figure out
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what the word means, I will look first at the word in general and then at Anselm's use of it.
"Astruendum" is the gerund of "astruere." Anselm uses
forms of the verb rarely, only five times in all his
works. 20 The word is built by adding the preposition "ad-"
to the verb, "struo," whose primary meaning is "to set," "to
arrange," or "to construct." This word survives in our word
"structure." In classical Latin, "astruo" meant "to build,"
"to heap or pile on," "to add," or "to provide." The Oxford
Latin Dictionary mentions no uses that could be described as
cognitive. 21 In classical Latin, "astruo" did not mean
anything like "to demonstrate" or "to prove."
That dictionary's immediate predecessor, the one by
Lewis and Short, confirms this conclusion. At the same time,
it recognizes that cognitive uses of the verb exist nonetheless. At the end of the entry for the word, the compilers
note that the "signification affirmare ••• is found in no
Latin author. " 22 They add that what appears to be an instance of that usage in Pliny is probably a bad reading. The
even older dictionary by Forcellini also refers specifically
to the questionable passage in Pliny. Forcellini too points
20

A Concordance of the Works of St. Anselm,
ed. G.R.
Evans, (Millwood, NY: Kraus International Publications, 1984),
s.v. "astru-."
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Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictio(1975) s.v. "astruo."
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out that others read the passage differently. 23
But whether or not the classical word was given a cognitive sense accidentally, through a bad reading of Pliny, or
by deliberate use of a metaphor, medieval authors did use it
that way. By referring to the misreading of Pliny, the classical dictionaries suggest that the word came to be a synonym for "affirmare," which means "to support," "to confirm," or "to assert." One sense of the word that a French
dictionary of the Latin used by Christian authors lists is
"to prove," and it refers specifically to the construction
of an argument. At the same time, it also suggests "to
guarantee" and "to affirm. " 24 My task is to try to determine
just what Anselm means.
Augustine uses the word in an interesting passage in his
Confessions. In Book 4, Chapter 15, he writes, "and I defined and distinguished as fair, what is so, absolutely of
itself; and fit, which becomes graceful when applied to some
other thing: and confirmed (astruebam) my argument by corporeal examples. " 25 Here, just as Watts suggests with his
translation, Augustine does not seem to mean that he demon23

Egidio Forcellini, Totius Latinitatis Lexicon,
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William Watts, (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1977), 190-1:
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corporeis adstruebam."
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strates or proves his definitions with examples. "Adstruebam" means "I added on to" or, perhaps better, "I
supported." Augustine has definitions. He builds them up, or
adds to them, by adding examples that confirm them. Augustine is very far from using the word the way that we use "to
prove." He does not refer to any argument.
But let me turn to Anselm. A survey of the four instances other than the one in the Proslogion in which Anselm uses
the word suggests that he himself means something like "to
add together," "to build up," or "to affirm." Though the
word could mean "to prove," that is not necessarily what it
means. The word occurs, in various forms, twice in de
Grammatico and twice in Cur Deus Homo.
De Grammatico is a dialogue between a teacher and a
student. In it, the word occurs close to the beginning and
very near the end. In the first instance, the teacher is
explaining an argument that he makes by process of elimination. There are two alternatives, and one of them must be
true. He says: "whatever is able to build up (ad astruendam)
one part, destroys the other, and whatever weakens one,
strengthens the other. " 26 Here, Anselm shows that he thinks
of "astruere" as a synonym for "roborare," which means "to
strengthen" or "make strong." This makes perfect sense if
the word means "to prove," but also if it means "to build
26

Anselm, 146: "quidquid valet ad astruendam unam partem,
destruit alteram,
et quidquid unam debilitat,
alteram
roborat."
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up" or "affirm."
Towards the end of the book, the teacher warns the
student against stubborn adherence to the conclusions that
they have come to together, "I do not want you so to cling
to these things that we have said that you hold on to them
stubbornly although someone be able to destroy them with
stronger arguments and build up (astruere) different
things." 27 Here too, Anselm uses the word to express the
possibility that someone might come along and, having used
arguments to destroy what he himself and his student hold,
goes on to build up, or construct, by whatever means, an
account different from the one he has developed with his
student. The construction of such an account might include
proof, but it might not.
Cur Deus Homo is also a dialogue. At one point, Anselm
asks his young friend Boso, "How should he be answered who
asserts (astruit) that what is necessary is impossible because he does not know how it could be?" 28 At another point,
later in the book, Anselm is discussing the necessity according to which.one can say that "the heavens revolve by
necessity because they revolve." He explains that this is
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Ibid., 168: "nolo te sic iis quae diximus inhaerere,
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the necessity that "seems to destroy any alternative and to
affirm ( astruere) that all things are by necessity. " 29
In the latter of these two cases, "astruere" seems to
mean something like "affirm" or "confirm," and if arguments
can carry the force of necessity, then this instance may
bear on what it means for an argument to be sought that will
"affirm" what we believe. But in the former case, the word
is used somewhat differently. The word could mean "to affirm" or "strengthen," but only in the sense that one could
be strengthened in a belief by one's own failure to imagine
any alternative to it. Here, the word. seems to mean more
nearly "to assert."
In general, then, "astruere" may have the sense of
building up claims, of affirmation, or of assertion. This
can involve an appeal to an argument, as the second example
from de Grammatico suggests, but this example does not
explain the relationship between the argument, on the one
hand, and the claim the argument concerns, on the other. And
just this question is crucial. The other example from that
book and the second example from Cur Deus Homo are even more
ambiguous; in neither case is it clear whether arguments or
proof have a role in affirming or showing at all. Finally,
the first example from Cur Deus Homo seems quite different.
There, the affirmation that the word points to is that of

29

Ibid., 125: "videtur utrumlibet destruere et omnia esse
ex necessitate astruere."
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someone who lacks an argument, someone who asserts because
he or she cannot conceive of an alternative. Even in the one
instance, then, that seems most clearly to involve an argument, the second example from de Grammatica, the only role
that is certainly given to argument is the one opposed to
affirmation. Anselm speaks of the possibility that someone
could come along and destroy the things that he and his
student have said with stronger arguments than those they
have used. He or she would then be able to build up a different account. But it is not certain whether Anselm means
that this person would build with arguments, or use arguments only to destroy positions that prevent the affirmation
of whatever he or she wants to affirm.
These four occurrences of the word thus suggest that
though the word might mean "to prove," it is not certain
that it does. The instance in which Anselm most explicitly
connects affirmation to argument, however, is the one in the
Proslogion. Thus the only way to determine just in what
sense his "single argument" is supposed to build up what
Anselm intends it to build is to observe the role of the
argument within the work.
Let me briefly review where my interpretation now
stands. I began with Anselm's own description of the role of
his argument. I did this by considering one crucial word of
that description, the verb "astruere." I showed that the
word can mean "to prove," but, also by looking at Anselm's
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various uses of the word that this is not certainly how he
understands it. Anselm's use covers a range of meanings: "to
affirm," "to build up," and "to assert." To consider such
evidence, however, does no more than open the way to the
central question: namely, what does the word mean when
Anselm uses it in the Proslogion?
Nothing less than a reading of the work as a whole can
tell, and it is worth noting that at least three standard
translations are quite different from the English ones we
already saw. Schmitt writes that Anselm sought an argument
"that would alone suffice to support that God exists in
truth. " 30 According to Stolz, Anselm sought to find an
argument sufficient "in order to show that God in truth has
being. " 31 Stolz' s word, "dartun," is ambiguous. It can mean
"demonstrate," but it can also mean merely "show" or "present." According to Alexandre Koyre, Anselm writes that he
sought an argument that would suffice "pour demontrer. " 32
The French word, like Stolz's German word, is ambiguous. It
could mean "to prove," but it could also mean "to point
out."
30
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We can begin to consider the word as it occurs in the
Proslogion by noticing that it has not one, but rather a
series of direct objects. Anselm seeks one argument sufficient to show, "that God truly is and _is the highest good,
needing none other, which all things require in order to be
and to be well and whatever we believe concerning divine
substance." 33 The verb thus has three objects: the first,
that God truly is; the second, that God is the highest good,
needing none other, which all things need both to be and to
be well; and the third, whatever we believe concerning
divine substance. This third, however, does not so much
point to any belief in particular, as it indicates that
there is more at stake than two claims about divine substance: it makes it clear that Anselm hopes that his one
argument will address all that he believes concerning divine
substance, that it will address what he believes as a whole.
For now, let us consider just the first two objects. One
way to see what Anselm means here is to ask why he seeks one
argument to show, to affirm, or to build up these beliefs.
Anselm himself invites special attention to this question by
reporting that it was the fact that the Monologion was
"woven together by the interconnection of many arguments" 34
that moved him to write the Proslogion in the first place.

33
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Why, then, does he seek one argument?
A return to Anselm's description of the persona in which
the book is written suggests a possible answer. Anselm says
that he writes:
in the person of one trying to lift up his mind to the
contemplation of God and seeking to understand what he
believes. 35
It is the second aspect of the task he describes that is
interesting here: Anselm writes as one seeking to understand
what he believes. To do so he must learn to see all that he
believes and see it all as one. This is because his beliefs
are many--that God truly is, that God is the highest good,
etc.--and because, for Anselm, "to understand" is to see a
whole at once. He confesses in Chapter 18 that the qualities
that God is "are many," and he adds, "My narrow understanding cannot see so many with one simultaneous insight, in
order that it might simultaneously be delighted by all. " 36
Perhaps, then, Anselm seeks to affirm all his beliefs about
God with one argument because he seeks to understand whatever he believes about God and because to do so is to see
those beliefs as a single whole.
The question is, then, how each of the arguments he
makes--or, more precisely, each of the analyses of his one

35
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argument--contributes to an effort to understand, or see,
God as a whole. I have already argued that the main force of
the arguments concerning the being of God is to set God
apart, to show that God's being is unique. I will now argue
that the next arguments in the book fit the same pattern.
For though they concern a wide range of divine qualities,
they all aim to identify God as "the highest good, needing
none other, that all things need both to be and to be well."
After Anselm has affirmed that God truly is, he seems to
turn rather to the third thing he proposes to affirm rather
than directly to the second. The chapters that follow the
discussion of God's being deal with a range of beliefs that
Anselm holds about God, and his most emphatic identification
of God as the highest good will wait until the second half
of the Proslogion. It appears that Anselm turns first to
affirming "whatever we believe about divine substance." But
this appearance deceives. The various analyses in Chapters 6
through 11 only aim to explain how God can be whatever it is
better to be than not to be, and Chapters 12 and 13 link
this with the claim that God is the source of all good.
These analyses, then, indeed affirm that God is "the highest
good, needing none other, which all things need in order to
be and be well.".
Let us go through these chapters in some detail. The
discussion of attributes begins in Chapter 5. There Anselm
makes two arguments: that God is the creator and that God is
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whatever it is better to be than not to be. The first
serves, as the arguments concerning God's being do, to
distinguish God from all else that is. The second opens the
fuller analysis of divine attributes that follows.
Chapter 4 had been a slight departure from the progress
of the argument. After having argued, in Chapter 3, that God
cannot even be thought not to be, Anselm explains in the
fourth chapter the one sense in which one could think, or
say in one's heart, that God is not. He explains that, in
one sense, "to think" means to think the word (vox) that
signifies a thing. Here, "to think" means nothing more than
to pronounce to oneself. In this limited sense of the word,
anything can be thought to be or not to be: one need only
say the words. Anselm points out that to think, in this
sense, that God is not requires only that one say the words,
"either without any (meaning] or with some foreign meaning.

,,37

Anselm then starts Chapter 5 with a question: "What,
then, are You, Lord God, than whom nothing greater can be
thought?" 38 He answers first with an argument. He argues for
a precise version of a claim that he has already made: that
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course of his identification of God as the being that caBnot
be thought not to be. That was in Chapter 3, where he pointed out that if God were not the being that is so truly that
it cannot be thought not to be, then "the creature would
ascend above the creator." 39 Here, he deduces that God is
the creator with· the same argument he used in order to show
that God truly is. 40 He writes:
But what are You unless [You are] that which is the
highest of all things, which alone [of all things]
exists through itself, and made all others from nothing?
For whatever is not this is less than could be thought.
But this cannot be thought concerning You. 41
Anselm emphasizes God's unique character in two ways: by
saying that God is the only thing that exists through itself
and by saying that God made all other things from nothing.
Anything less would be less than can be thought.
But Anselm goes on: if God is the highest of all, which
created all, then God must be whatever it is better to be
than not to be. For with respect to any given good, Anselm
can ask whether it could be absent from God. He can conclude
that it could not by appealing to the same argument that he
has just used: that God would then be less than can be
39
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thought. In fact, he asks, "What good is then absent from
the highest good, through which every good is?" 42 He answers
with a list of the goods that God is, a list that introduces
the analyses of particular goods that will follow, and he
completes the list by concluding that God is "whatever it is
better to be than not to be • " 4 3
This is the second indication that the series of analyses that flow out of Anselm's one argument are parts of
Anselm's effort to see all that he believes about divine
substance and see it all in one gaze. The first was that
Anselm aims at a whole: the third object of astruendum is
"whatever we believe." The second is that Anselm summarizes
his list of divine attributes by saying that God is "whatever it is better to be than not to be." But it is worth also
looking more closely at the arguments that Anselm makes
about particular attributes in order to see whether these
arguments also point towards a whole.
The analysis of particular goods takes the form of a
series of reflections on pairs of qualities that seem mutually exclusive, or contradictory. Anselm asks how God could
be sensitive though not a body (Chapter 6), omnipotent
though unable to do many things (Chapter 7), and merciful
though impassive (Chapter 8). It will be necessary to return
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to the third of these later, but for now I will only point
out that in each case Anselm resolves the difficulty by
explaining that it depends on human misunderstanding. God
can be said to be sensible, but only in the sense that God
knows, in a divine way, what a creature that sees or hears
knows by hearing or sight. Though omnipotent, God can be
said to be unable to do many things, because sometimes we
says "unable" when we should, more properly, say "able": God
is, for example, unable to do evil, but this "inability" is
really a power--a power to avoid doing evil. God can be said
to be merciful, even though impassive, because God's presence is a consolation to one in pain, even if God does not
feel pain. In each case, qualities like sensible, incapable,
and merciful have special meanings when they refer to God.
Ans.elm then spends three chapters reflecting upon apparent contradictions between God's justice and God's mercy, or
goodness. The problem for Anselm is to understand how it is
fitting for God both to punish those who are evil and to
forgive them. Generally speaking, he finds each alternative
easy enough to explain by itself by pointing to the appropriate sense of justice:
How, then, is it just that You punish those who are evil
and just that You pardon those who are evil? Do You
justly, in one sense, punish those who are evil and
justly, in another sense, pardon them? For when You
punish those who are evil, it is just because it agrees
with their merits; when, however, You pardon them, it is
just not because it befits their merits, but because it
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befits Your goodness. 44
From all this he concludes that justice simply means
what God wishes:· "For that alone which You wish is just, and
what You do not wish is not just." But he cannot explain why
any particular case should have one result rather than
another. He continues:
Thus Your mercy is born of Your justice, because it is
just that You be so good that You are good in pardoning.
And this is perhaps why the highest justice can wish
good things for those who are evil. But if it is somehow
possible to grasp why You can wish to save those who are
evil, surely no reason can comprehend why, of similar
evil [people], You save some rather than others through
highest goodness and condemn some rather than others
through highest justice. 45
The result of this analysis, then, is Anselm's admission
that he cannot understand the individual instances of God's
justice. Even if he can explain how any given instance of
God's judgment exemplifies justice, he cannot explain why it
should exemplify justice in one way rather than in another.
At the end he returns to the claim that the four analy-
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ses began with, that God is whatever it is better to be than
not to be. He sununarizes, "Thus therefore truly You are
sensible, omnipotent, merciful and impassive, in some sense
living, knowing, good, blessed, eternal and whatever it is
better to be than not to be. " 46 The first words here show
that this is a sununary, and, so, that all the analyses since
i

Anselm firsh made the claim that God is whatever it is
better to be than not to be are only efforts to explain the
claim. This claim needs explanation, because one could think
that some good qualities would conflict with others. Anselm
faces what appear to be particular instances of conflict,
and works each apparent conflict out.
The chapter that follows, the twelfth, connects this
claim--that God is whatever it is better to be than not to
be--with the earlier claim that God is the highest good,
needing none other, and thus with the. claims about God's
being. This might not be inunediately obvious. It is the
shortest chapter in the Proslogion, and in it Anselm draws a
single conclusion: God does not have attributes, but is
attributes:
But surely whatever You are, You are through nothing
other than Yourself. You are, thus, the very life by
which You live, and the knowledge by which You know, and
the very goodness by which You are good to good and
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evil; and thus [also] concerning similar cases. 47
To see the connection between this argument and the claim
that God is the highest good, one need only recall the form
of the latter in Chapter 5. There, Anselm said that God is
"the highest of all things," and specified that by adding
"the one who, alone [of all things] existing through itself,
made all things from nothing." It is the middle of this
claim that is interesting now--namely, that God, alone of
all things, exists per se--because to make this claim is to
say that God is the being through which God is. Put in this
form the claim is exactly parallel to the claims that God is
the life by which God lives, the knowledge by which God
knows, and the goodness by which God is good. Even if Anselm
uses the preposition "per" with the accusative in one case
(existens per se), and uses a relative pronoun in the ablative in the others (for example: ipsa vita gua vivis), it is
clear enough that this difference is merely verbal. After
all, Anselm he iptroduces the series of ablatives as explanations of a point he makes with the other construction:
"whatever You are, You are through nothing other than Yourself" (non per aliud guam per teipsum).
What Anselm says about goodness is of special interest.
What does it mean to say that God is the goodness by which
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God is good except to say that God is the one good that is
good through itself--that God is, simply, the good itself?
It is a small step to the belief that Anselm says, in the
preface, he wants to affirm: that God is the highest good,
needing none other. To see the rigor of the step one need
only notice that, if one were to respond to Anselm by arguing that to say that God is the goodness through which God
is good is not quite to identify God as the highest good, he
can answer with the argument he knows so well: if God is
less than the highest good, then, if a highest good can be
thought to be, God is not that than which none greater can
be thought.
Now, one might still argue that Anselm has fallen short
of affirming what he sought to affirm, since he has not yet
argued that God is the good that all other goods need. But
it should be remembered that even as.early as Chapter 5,
when Anselm argues that God is the only being that exists
per se, he adds that God must also, as the only being who
exists per se, have created all other things from nothing.
He writes, "Whatever is not this is less than could be
thought. " 48 When Anselm goes on in Chapter 12 to say to God,
"You are the very goodness by which You are good to good and
evil," that God is, and does not merely possess, each of
God's qualities, this only specifies the general claim that
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God made all things from nothing. What is at least implicit
in the series of.claims in Chapter 12 is that, as the very
life, for example, by which God lives, God is also the life
by which all others live. And so for each of the qualities
Anselm mentions: God is the knowledge by which God and all
others know and the goodness by which God and all others are
good.
There are also two hints later in the book that this is
what Anselm means. In the first place, the very next chapter, the thirteenth, concerns the relationship between God
and other eternal spirits. Anselm brings this question up
because the existence of unlimited and eternal spirits might
appear to argue that God is not the source of being, life,
and goodness for all things. One might think that if a soul,
for example, is eternal then it cannot have a limit to its
being, and, so, cannot have been created by God. One might
think that anything eternal must, somehow, be its own
source. But Anselm insists that such spirits are eternal
only compared with bodies. They are, as "created spirits,
limited compared to" God. 49
In the second place, Anselm laments in Chapter 17 that
he is unable to perceive the aspect of God's beauty proper
to any of his five senses. I will come back to this, but let
me note already that he concludes by explaining, "You have
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these [beauties] in You in Your ineffable way, [You] who
gave them to the things created by You [so that they might
have them] in their sensible way.

1150

What is decisive here

is that, for Anselm, God's being certain qualities is intimately connected with God's giving these qualities to creatures. That God is the goodness by which God is good thus
implies, especially in the context of the claim that God is
the only being that exists per se, that God is also the
goodness by which creatures are good.
But to see this is to complete the claim that, after
having affirmed that God truly is, Anselm goes on in the
next chapters to affirm that God is "the highest good,
needing none other, that all things need both to be and to
be well." It shows, in other words, more of what Anselm
intends to build up, or affirm, even if it does not show
what this building up or affirming is.
Let us now, however, come back to the attempt to answer
this question. The word "astruere" has, as we've seen, a
range of meanings. It could mean, though not in this case,
to prove with an argument. It could mean, though again not
in this case, to support with appeals to empirical examples.
It could also mean, though not in this case, to refer to
passages in the Bible or the church fathers. It is still not
clear what Anselm means by the word. I have shown, however,
50
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sensibili modo."
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that he uses his one argument to do something--whether to
affirm, to build up, or to prove--with or to a series of
claims, and also that whatever it is that he does, he does
in the person of one trying to understand what he believes.
I have also shown that "to understand" means to see a whole
at once. Perhaps his desire for a single argument is nothing
but the natural consequence of what understanding means to
him. Perhaps he seeks his one argument in order to see his
various beliefs about God in their connectedness, as a
single whole--that is to understand them.
Even this supposition, though, fails to specify completely what Anselm means by "astruere." It does, however,
suggest two alternatives. On the one hand, the verb could
have a nearly literal sense: it could mean "build up" in the
sense that Anselm uses his one argument to build various
beliefs into a single whole much in the way a mason builds
up one house out of many bricks. Each belief is one brick,
and every time Anselm shows that his one argument affirms it
he adds that belief to the whole that he can see at a
glance.
But this simple account has at least three problems.
First, it runs slightly against the other occurrences of the
verb: in each case in which astruere involves an argument,
the argument seems to add to a belief rather than to connect
several beliefs. Second, it leaves tbe relationship between
the argument that builds and the beliefs that are its bricks
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undetermined: does the argument prove the belief, does it
illuminate it, or is something else at work? Third, it
suggests that there is some complex structure, built by the
analysis of the argument, that one is supposed to be able to
see at one gaze.
On the other hand, we could use my characterization of
the analyses that concern the being of God in order to
understand the word "astruere." Those analyses make the most
sense understood as explorations, beginning with a sense of
God's presence, that show how Anselm's one argument, as an
expression of that sense, displays that God is in the very
manner in which Anselm believes God to be. This is not to
say that Anselm sets out to "prove" that God is in just that
manner if this would be to suggest that Anselm sets out to
establish his belief as true--as though it were a controversial claim. Anselm aims rather to show how a belief that he
already has is connected to his one argument, how his one
argument affirms, or agrees with, this belief.
If this account characterizes the relationship, in each
case, between the argument and the various beliefs that
Anselm holds even without the argument, then the role of
Anselm's argument is to express the experience of God's
presence in a manner that allows him to see everything he
holds about divine substance in one gaze, not by building
those beliefs into one structure, but by seeing how one way
of expressing God's presence, one short argument, touches
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them all.
The decisive moments of the first part of the Proslogion
are thus the affirmations that I have pointed to. In each
case, Anselm shows how he can see, in his experience of
God's presence, some belief that he holds about divine
substance. He does so by showing how the belief is affirmed
by the argument that expresses God's presence. This is to
say: Anselm begins with an experience of God's presence; he
expresses the "object" of that experience when he says that
God is "that than which a greater cartnot be thought"; by
analyzing this "one argument" he shows how his particular
beliefs about God each are affirmed by it. He does not
establish that these beliefs are true. He does not weave his
beliefs together, or assemble them into a whole. He shows
that one way of expressing what he experiences when he
experiences the presence of God affirms whatever he believes
about God. By doing so he seeks to see all that he believes
concerning God at once, and this is what it means to seek to
understand.
But this account still leaves serious problems. It only
explains one half of the Proslogion. I will argue that it
could not serve as an account of the book as a whole. In
fact, what Anselm goes on to say seems to undermine this
account: he will discover that he has not found God, that
his argument has not enabled him to understand, because what
God is cannot be expressed in an argument, cannot be thought
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at all. I will now have to turn to these difficulties.

CHAPTER 5
Reasoning, Celebration, and Prayer
My effort to understand the role that Anselm's argument
plays within the Proslogion has thus far been a process of
elimination. I began by assuming that the second and third
chapters are Anselm's polemical attempt to establish that
God exists. Two sorts of considerations weighed against this
assumption.
On one hand, Anselm's argument fails if understood in
this way. An anaiysis of the case made for the ontological
argument by Malcolm and Plantinga suggests that it depends
on a controversial assumption that God is possible. Malcolm
and Plantinga show that the argument can prove that if God
is possible, then God must be, and each describes reasons
for a presumption that God is possible. Neither man, however, understands himself to have established anything beyond
a presumption, and Plantinga claims no more than that some
people could have reason to assume that God can be. For
these authors, this may be enough. They aim to show no more
that the belief in God is not irrational, and therefore need
only point out, as Malcolm does, that to expect a general
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proof that God is possible is to expect too much. 1 But even
if we were to assume that Anselm's intent is polemical, it
would be hard to believe that the intent of his polemics was
to show that his faith is not irrational. If his intent was
polemical at all, it would make more sense to assume that he
sought to prove that God exists.
On the other hand, there is evidence in Anselm's text
that this was not his aim. His designs were different from
those of the various thinkers who have tried to turn his
argument into a proof. I noted first that Anselm begins his
argument by affirming God's presence; next, that his interlocutor is not so much an atheist as a foolish and willful
aspect of himself; and then, that his argument treats not of
the fact of God's existence but of the manner of God's
being.
My second account still assumed, despite this third
point, that Anselm's argument is an attempt to prove the
existence of God, but it also took seriously the fact that
Anselm begins his argument from an experience of God's
presence. It took the argument to be an argument from experience for the existence of God, and thus solved the main
challenge to the rigor of the ontological argument. If,
after all, the argument begins with an experience that God
is present, it is no longer controversial to assume that God
is possible.
1

Malcolm, 157.
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This account, however, raised another problem. It forced
us to ask what the function of such an argument could be.
This is to ask what an argument for God's existence that is
from experience could mean. A more careful look at the words
that Anselm uses, together with a consideration of the range
of analyses of which the ones concerning God's existence are
just a part, pointed towards an answer: Anselm's argument is
his attempt to understand all that he believes about divine
substance--about the unique manner of its being and about
all the qualities that it is. He uses his argument in an
attempt to see all his beliefs as a whole, and to see them
at a glance. As Anselm says, in words he finds in the Bible,
his argument is an attempt to see God's face.
This conclusion is not original •. It is closely related
to the interpretation of the book suggested by Anselm Stolz.
I have already discussed one part of his position--his
understanding of "vere esse"--but I should also describe his
view of the whole. Stolz concludes that the book is Anselm's
search for a mystical experience of God. Anselm would like,
he writes, "to be led, through the reflection on God and his
qualities, to the mystical experience of God." 2 My interpretation so far has suggested that Stolz may be right. It is
important to recognize, however, that such a conclusion does

2
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not, by itself, take us very far. Stolz's interpretation is
based on his conviction that Anselm belongs in a particular
religious tradition, rooted in the writings of Augustine and
Gregory the Great. 3 There is nothing wrong with such an
approach, and nothing false about the conclusions it leads
to, but it does not answer the question as to the role
Anselm's argument and his analyses of that argument play
within his search--even if it does tell us what that search
is a search for.
Thus, though I insist that Anselm's work begins from an
experience of God, and agree that Anselm also seeks an experience of God, I must still determine how his argument
serves that end. When I concluded that Anselm's argument
might be a means of searching for a vision of God, I immediately suggested that this account would have problems of its
own. On one hand, it is hard to believe that Anselm expects
his argument to bring him to a vision of God. On the other,
the account at best explains only the first half of the
book. In the middle of the book, Anselm shows that he does
not believe that his argument has given him or can give him
what he seeks. Let us now consider how Anselm faces the
limits of the analytical thinking, the reasoning, he employs
through Chapter 13.
At the beginning of Chapter 14, Anselm asks himself a
striking question:
3

Ibid.
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But have you, my soul, found what you were seeking?
You were seeking God, and you found Him to be a certain
highest of all, than which nothing better can be
thought, and. this to be life itself, light, wisdom,
goodness, eternal blessedness and blessed eternity, and
this to be everywhere and always. If you have not found
your God, how is He.what you have found and what you
have understood Him to be with such certain truth and
such true certainty?
If, however, you have found [God], why is it that
you do not feel what you have found? 4
And he then turns the question towards God, "Why does my
soul not feel You, Lord God, if it has found You?" 5
Anselm has discovered himself to be in a quandary. He is
confident that his analyses thus far are correct--he says
that they are true and certain--but he does not feel their
object. He is certain that he has understood various things
about God, certain that he has found God, but he realizes
that he does not· feel the God he has found. This is particularly strange because we found that Anselm begins from a
sense--we might say a feeling--of God's presence. In light
of his beginning, how does Anselm arrive at a moment at
which he questions whether he has found God?
Let us consider first how Anselm arrives at this dilem4
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ma, and then where the dilemma leaves him. We will then be
in a position to see the direction that the dilemma gives
the remainder of his book and what this direction implies
for the attempt to understand the role of his argument in
the work as a whole. First, however, I will argue that the
dilemma arises for Anselm because the conclusions he comes
to in his discussion of God's qualities force him to ask
himself whether he has found God. I will then argue that, in
response to this self-questioning, Anselm's argument takes
on a critical force. It becomes, in part, an argument about
the limit of his reasoning. Finally, I will show how this
realization leads Anselm to employ thinking in other ways.
First, then, let me describe how Anselm arrives at his
dilemma. The question he asks his soul--whether it has found
what it was searching for--may seem sudden, but it has been
prepared by the discussion of divine attributes that precedes it. Through the analyses in Chapters 6, 7, and 8, a
recognition emerges that God does not appear to Anselm as
God is in se. In Chapter 6, Anselm explains how God could be
sensible though incorporeal, and in Chapter 7, how God could
be omnipotent though incapable of many things. In each case,
Anselm's explanation hinges on the recognition that words
must be used with special care when they describe God. He
argues that God can be said to be sensible, because although
God does not perceive through the five senses, to sense is
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"nothing but to come to know, " 6 and what we know by means of
the senses God knows by the means that are God's. He argues
that God can be said to be unable to do many things, because
what we mean by God's inability is an inability to do wrong,
which is, more precisely, not a limit but a strength.
Anselm takes this line of discovery a step farther in
Chapter 8. It is not merely that words have special meanings
when one tries to talk about God. One's sense of God, the
sense one can strive to express in words, is distinct from
what God is. The distinction becomes an issue as Anselm
tries to explain how it is that God could be merciful and
impassive. He insists that since God is impassive, God could
not be merciful, "For if You are impassive, You feel no
compassion; if You feel no compassion, then Your heart is
not wretched out of compassion for the wretched--which is
what it means to be merciful." 7 But although God cannot be
merciful, one can feel mercy from God. Anselm explains, "You
are indeed (merciful] according to our sense, and not according to Yours. For when You look upon us who are wretched, we feel the effect of mercy, but You do not feel the
6
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affect." 8 In other words, one's sense of God's presence can
serve as consolation even if God does not suffer in se. God
is impassive, but seems compassionate. Anselm thus acknowledges a distinction between what God is and how God seems.
It is, then, in a context set by this distinction that
Anselm goes on to ask himself whether he has found God. For
though his analyses have led him to draw a range of conclusions concerning God, he cannot, in light of this distinction, assume that his conclusions touch upon anything more
than how God seems to be. Anselm must ask whether he has
come to see, or understand, God, and he begins Chapter 14
with just this question.
As he proceeds to answer the question, he shows no lack
of confidence that the analyses he has gone through thus far
are correct. We already saw that he describes what he has
found as having been found by "certain truth and true certainty." Anselm will reject nothing he has said in the
book's first thirteen chapters. With such confidence he can
argue that he must have seen God in some sense:
If [my soul] has not found You, whom did it find to be
light and truth? For how could it have understood this
except by seeing light and truth? Or could it have
understood anything at all about You except through Your
light and Your truth? If, therefore, it sees light and
truth, it sees You. If it does not see You, it sees

8
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neither light nor truth. 9
Because Anselm believes that God is light and truth, and
because he believes that he could only have seen this by
seeing light and truth, Anselm concludes that he either must
have seen God or· not have seen light and truth at all. One
might expect him to conclude the latter in the face of his
feeling that he has not found God, but instead he finds a
middle way. He concludes that his soul has seen something of
God, even if it has not seen God as God is, "Or is truth and
light what it has seen, and nonetheless it has not seen You,
because it has seen You in a sense, but has not seen You
just as You are?" 10 In other words, even if Anselm must
admit that he can only see God as God seems, he need not
conclude, in any simple way, that he has not seen God. For
Anselm, to see God as God seems is indeed to see God, but to
see God only in a sense.
The chapter continues with Anselm's insistence that his
inability to see God must be ascribed both to God's greatness and to his own limitation, and ends with a series of
exclamations expressing wonder at God's greatness. Anselm

9
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phrases the exclamations as questions about the extent of
that greatness, questions that he can answer in one short
sentence: God's greatness is "surely more than can be understood by a creature." 11
This conclusion leads to the most curious chapter in the
whole work. In Chapter 15, Anselm shows that God cannot be
thought. To do so he uses the same reasoning he has used
over and over already:
Therefore, Lord, not only are You that than which a
greater cannot be thought, but You are something greater
than could be thought. For since something of this kind
can be thought to be, if You are not this very thing,
something can be thought [that is] greater than You-which cannot happen. 12
Few of those who analyze Anselm's argument as an attempt
to prove the existence of God take note of this chapter. I
pointed to an example of someone who.does not when I discuss.ed how Plantinga understands Anselm's claim that something can be thought. Plantinga, we saw, understands it to
ref er to a state of affairs and to mean that the state of
affairs is logically possible. Anselm's Chapter 15 shows

11

Ibid., 112: "Quanta namque est lux illa, de qua micat
omne verum, quod rationali menti lucet! Quam ampla est illa
veritas, in qua est omne quod verum est et extra quam non nisi
nihil et falsum est! Quam immensa est, quae uno intuito videt,
quaecumque facta sunt, et a quo et per quern et quomodo de
nihilo facta sunt! Quid puritatis, quid simplicitatis, quid
certitudinis et splendoris ibi est! Certe plus quam a creatura
valeat intelligi."
12

Ibid.: "Ergo, Domine, non solum es quo maius cogitari
neguit, sed es quiddam maius quam cogitari possit. Quoniam
namque valet cogitari esse aliquid huiusmodi: si tu non es hoc
ipsum, potest cogitari maius te~ quod fieri nequit."

115
that this could not be the case. If it were, one would be
forced to understand the argument here as a claim that God
is so great as to be logically impossible. Aside from the
particular difficulty this interpretation would present for
the attempt to understand Anselm's claim that "a being of
this kind can be thought to be," such an interpretation
seems most unlikely. How likely is it, after all, that
Anselm understood himself to have shown in Chapter 15 that
God is impossible?
Charlesworth takes slightly more account of the passage.
In his commentary on the chapter, he points out that it is
important, and summarizes Anselm's claim, "Here, in this
important discussion, St. Anselm reminds us that, even if we
understand God to be 'that than which nothing greater can be
thought,' we do not thereby have a positive or determinate
knowledge of God." 13 What Charlesworth does not explain is
why the chapter is important: he makes no effort to consider
its role in the work as a whole. His commitment to the claim
that the early chapters are an attempt to prove God's existence closes him to the rest of the book. He devotes less
than a page of commentary to the last eleven chapters, and
concludes his few remarks on Chapter 15 by suggesting that
Anselm might just as well have left the question in the
hands of later, better theoretically equipped minds, "To
deal adequately with this whole question St. Anselm would of
13
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course need a theory of analogical predication, such as
Aquinas was to develop later. " 14
At least one interpreter, however, has taken careful
stock of the passage, and I shall take my direction, if not
my conclusion, from him. Jean-Luc Marion discusses this part
of Anselm's analysis in the course of showing that Anselm's
argument for the existence of God is not ontological. 15
Marion emphasizes the sense in which Chapter 15 demonstrates
the inadequacy of the attempt to conceptualize, or think,
God. His surprising conclusion makes Anselm out to be something of a proto-Kantian:
If, according to Kant, the word "transcendental"
means ••• never a relation of thought with things, but
only with our power [or faculty] of thinking, then we
must conclude paradoxically that the argument of Anselm
aims at a transcendent but inaccessible item only
through the transcendental test of our cogitatio. 16
Marion adds that such prominent critics of the argument as
Kant and Thomas Aquinas miss the point because they fail to
see its critical character. He writes of Kant that "it is
not the least paradoxical that Kant was the first to miss
the point and to criticize Anselm as if he had not been
critical--in Kant's very sense--as Kant himself was supposed
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to be. " 17 And even though he writes that Kant was the first
to make the mistake, he nonetheless goes on to judge Thomas
along similar lines:
The whole burden of the Thomistic refutation rests upon
the fact that God is not obviously known by us, ••• so
that we are deprived of any concept of him; therefore
Thomas strongly confirms our interpretation of Anselm's
argument. 18
Marion notes in summary that it is, for Anselm, precisely
the impossibility of forming a concept of God that proves
that God exists:
Therefore Anselm's argument infers God's existence from
the very impossibility of producing any concept of God
or His essence, according to a critical and transcendental examination of the limits of our power of thinking .19
I disagree with Marion on several levels: I do not think
that Anselm's argument is exclusively or even primarily
critical, nor that it is an argument for the existence of
God. But Marion's point should be well taken, even if it
does not take us very far. First of all, it is well worth
wondering what a detailed reconstruction of the argument, so
conceived, would look like. One way of understanding it
would be more Cartesian than Kantian: it might be that
Anselm begins with an experience of the presence of God and
then deduces that God must exist in fact, and not merely in

his own thought, by showing that God could not exist in his
17
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own thought. The argument would thus foreshadow the one Descartes makes on the basis of the presence of the idea of the
infinite in the finite mind. 20
But though Marion's point should be well taken, it
cannot and should not be taken too far, even if the
argument's critical aspect plays an important role in the
work as a whole •. Anselm does insist in Chapter 15 that God
cannot be thought, but this does not mean, as Marion suggests, that he thinks of the impossibility of thinking God
as a proof that God exists. In the first place, Anselm draws
no such conclusion from Chapter 15. In fact, there is no
talk that could be interpreted as though it concerned the
existence of God after the first few chapters of the book.
In the second place, none of the talk of God's being in the
Proslogion, even the analyses of Chapters 2 and 3, is aimed
by Anselm at proving that God exists. In the third place,
Marion's exclusive emphasis on the critical aspect of the
argument in Chapter 15 comes at a price: he does not attend
to Anselm's parallel insistence that he also has come to see
God.
If, then, Chapter 15 is not, as Marion suggests, the
final proof that God exists, I must ask what it is. The
first thing to consider is its relation to what precedes it,
in Chapter 14 and before, if for no other reason than because this will provide the final evidence for my early
20
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claim that "astruere" does not mean "to prove."
The first word of Chapter 15, "therefore" (ergo), marks
it as a conclusion that follows on the last words of Chapter
14. Though one should not exaggerate this--"ergo" does not
here mean what it would mean in Euclid or Copi--it does
suggest that the analysis it introduces follows upon the
claim that precedes it. That claim summarizes the discovery
Anselm made, in Chapter 14, that though he has found God in
a sense, he must also admit that he has not found God. God,
he concludes, must "surely be more than could be understood
by a creature. " 21
The analysis Anselm undertakes in Chapter 15 does not so
much prove a new conclusion as affirm this discovery. The
force of what he writes at the end of Chapter 14 is clear
enough: God is too great to understand. But it is possible
to say more about the understanding that connects this
conclusion to the conclusion that God cannot be thought and
the analysis by which he comes to this conclusion. We saw
already that Anselm writes in Chapter 4 that something can
be thought in either of two ways, either verbally or according to an understanding of the thing .(res) to be thought. 22
Anselm thus implies that any thinking that is not merely
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verbal relies on. some understanding. That God cannot be
understood thus entails that God cannot be thought, and the
analysis of Chapter 15 confirms or explores this conclusion.
Thus, it is even more clear here than elsewhere that "to
affirm"

(astruere) does not have a polemical sense. It does

not mean "to demonstrate" or "to prove." The claim that God
cannot be thought is a conclusion that follows directly upon
another Anselm has just come to: that God cannot be understood. He does not draw that conclusion by means of an
analysis of his argument. The argument does not even appear
in Chapter 14. The conclusion arises out of Anselm's reflection on the feeling he has that his argument has not enabled
him to see God as he would like to. This feeling has arisen
in him in the course of his reflections on his argument.
Just as the work as a whole begins with Anselm's experience
that God is present to him, this second part of the work
begins with the experience that he has not come to understand God, has not seen God just as God is, has not seen
God's face.
But it is important not to over-simply. Anselm's position in Chapter 14 does suggest, in general, that whatever
we fail to understand we shall also be unable to think. He
has not, however, claimed that he is unable to understand
God at all. He labels Chapter 14, "In What Way and Why God
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is Seen and Not Seen By Those Seeking Him. " 23 To the extent
to which God is seen, God can be thought, and just this
thinking has been Anselm's task through the first half of
the Proslogion. He will never in the course of the latter
part of the work repudiate the progress he has made.
At the same time, an important moment in that progress
is the discovery of the difference between the way God seems
to us and the way God is. Anselm realizes that he has not
yet seen God as God is, and he shows that his one argument
can affirm even this realization. We shall see that this
realization becomes the driving force for the additional
progress Anselm goes on to make.
To say, however, that Anselm's argument affirms what he
believes is not to say that the reasoning in Chapter 15
simply confirms something Anselm already knows, as though
Anselm were to make knowledge that is less firm firmer by
appealing to the_ argument. Anselm's lament in Chapter 14
shows that reflection on his experience has already entirely
convinced him that the analyses of his argument have not
brought him to see God's face. He has found God, but only in
the limited sense that he there suggests. This knowledge
that his discovery is limited need not be made more firm.
What the analysis of Chapter 15 does show is that Anselm
can use his one argument to show everything he believes
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about divine substance--including his belief that divine
substance is beyond whatever he believes. Here, belief is
expressed in a sort of thinking. Anselm has expressed what
he believes in a series of statements he can think, or say
in his heart, about God. Anselm has used his argument in an
attempt to see God, in one glance, as what God is, by showing how his one argument combines all his various beliefs.
But Chapter 14 expresses his feeling that he must fail to do
so, and Chapter 15 shows that his one argument affirms even
this belief. Anselm's one argument entails a criticism that
turns it back on itself.
One can confirm that much of the force of Anselm's argument in Chapter 15 is critical by considering the chapters
that immediately follow it. Though those chapters also show
that his argument is not merely critical, Anselm dwells on
his failure to see God. He does so even as he also explains
what he means in Chapter 14 when he says that he sees God to
some extent (aliguatenus).
After he has considered the sense in which his argument
fails, Anselm continues. Though he discovers that analyzing
his argument enables him to see that his ability to see God
by means of his argument is limited, he does not conclude
his Proslogion. In Chapter 18, he returns to his search for
God.

The recognition of that limit leads to a shift in the

nature of Anselm's thinking through the last chapters of the
Proslogion. His thinking shifts twice, in fact. We shall see
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that his transformed thinking takes him farther than the
analysis of his argument than his reasoning can. To emphasize, as Marion does, that what Anselm discovers by the
analysis of his argument is that God cannot be thought may
be to say something true, but it does not say enough. It is
necessary to chart the course on which the discovery of his
argument's limit leads Anselm, not only in order to understand the work as a whole, but to understand the real force
of the beginning of the work as well. If our guiding question is how Anselm attempts to use thinking in order to
understand, then we must consider how his discovery of the
limit of that thinking which is characterized by analysis of
his one argument leads him to think of thinking in different
ways. After discovering the limit of reasoning, Anselm turns
to thinking that he calls "coniectatio" 24 and then to thinking that is prayer.
Before considering those shifts, let me review what I
have argued about the character of the first manner of
Anselm's thought. I have referred several times to the
analysis of his one argument, but it is important to understand what this means.
Anselm begins the Proslogion with a sense of God's presence. He attempts to express what he experiences in a statement: "something than which nothing greater could be

24
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"Coniectatio, -guale et
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thought" (aliguid quo nihil maius cogitari possit). The
wording of the statement varies through the book. Sometimes
Anselm says "that" (id) instead of "something" (aliguid),
sometimes he says "better" (melius) instead of "greater"
(maius), and he has several ways of saying either that
nothing greater can be thought or that something greater
cannot be thought. All his formulations suggest the one
argument he uses throughout the first half of the book: if
God's being is not true, for example, then God is not that
than which none greater can be thought. Anselm takes up
various beliefs about God, and analyzes his one argument in
order to show how it affirms them each. Here, "analyze"
means that he works out what his argument implies, works out
how it implies each of the beliefs he holds about God. He
does so in order to show that each belief is, in a sense,
present in his argument and thus to show that to understand
the words of his argument is to see them all at a glance,
and thus to see God.
Eventually he discovers, by reflecting on what his
argument has revealed to him, that the effort does not bring
him to see God, and he affirms even this discovery by appeal
to the very same argument. He explains that the qualities
his argument affirms in God are many, so that he cannot see
them "in a single simultaneous gaze" (uno simul intuitu),
even though the same one argument also affirms that they are
indivisibly one in God. Anselm's failure is a failure to
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express all that God is. Anselm's one argument may remain
the same throughout the analyses that use it, but those
analyses take time. One follows another. The argument itself
also takes time. Word follows word. Words cannot express
what God is because God's utter simplicity sets God apart.
Anselm emphasizes: "You are unity itself, not divisible by
any understanding.
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Having failed to say what God is, Anselm attempts to ask
how good God must be. Anselm calls this "coniectatio," and
that is how he labels Chapter 24. In it, Anselm exhorts
himself, one more time, to think, "Awaken now, my soul, and
lift up your whole understanding, and think, as much as you
can, what sort and how great is that good." 26 This he writes
immediately after declaring, at the end of Chapter 23, just
what good he has in mind, "But one thing is necessary. But
this is that one necessary thing, in which is every good,
or, rather, which is every [good] and the one [good] and the
whole [good] and· the only good. " 27 The one necessary thing,
the one good he has in mind, is, of course, God. His
coniectatio, then, is an attempt to think God by asking what
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unum necessarium, in quo est omne bonum, immo quod est omne et
unum et totum et solum bonum."
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sort of good and how great a good God is.
It is tempting to translate his word, "coniectatio" with
our word "conjecture." Standard translations of the
Proslogion do just this. But that word is deceiving because
it generally means something like "guess." In addition,
though "conjecture" might strike us as a close cognate of
Anselm's word, there is another Latin word closer to "conjecture" than Anselm's word: "coniectura." This word does
mean a conjecture or a guess.
I have chosen to translate Anselm's word as "celebration." This has advantages and disadvantages, and I should
present them right now. We use our verb, "to celebrate," in
two ways: intransitively and transitively. Each way expresses an aspect of Anselm's coniectatio. As an intransitive
verb, "to celebrate" means to rejoice. As such, the word
well captures the tone of this part of the Proslogion.
Chapters 24 and 25 are filled with the words that mean
delight and delightful (delectation and delectibile), pleasure and pleasant (iucunditas and iucundus), and enjoy
(fruor). Anselm is here rejoicing or celebrating.
As a transitive verb, "to celebrate" emphasizes that in
my rejoicing I am turning my attention to something in
particular that is the object of my rejoicing. When, for
example, I celebrate Passover, I joyfully turn my attention
to God's gift of freedom from Pharaoh for the children of
Israel. When I celebrate a friend's birthday, I joyfully
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turn my attention to that friend. In this respect as well,
"celebration" captures an aspect of Anselm's coniectatio. In
fact, Anselm's coniectatio is just this: his attempt to turn
his attention joyfully toward God.
The translation I have chosen, however, does present
problems. First, it is not a usual translation for Anselm's
word. Standard translations use "conjecture." Second, the
translation is jarring: I will insist that Anselm's celebration is a form of thinking, and in doing so I surely strain
English usage--perhaps too far. Finally, it has no historical or etymological connection to Anselm's word--none, at
least, that I know of. But I am willing to accept these
difficulties. The question at issue for me is just how to
characterize thinking, and so for me to use a word that
draws attention to itself may be, in the end, an advantage.
I will consider Anselm's celebration from two sides: how
Anselm prepares it in the chapters leading up to it, and its
character as a form of thinking. Anselm prepares it in a
series of chapters that aim at identifying God as the one
good. This identification takes its departure from a summary
that Anselm gives in Chapter 18 as a response to the discovery that he has not found God, "What are You, Lord, what are
You? What does my heart understand You to be? Surely You are
life, You are wisdom, You are truth, You are goodness, You
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are beauty, You are eternity, and You are every true
good." 28 Anselm goes on to point out a difficulty that this
summary presents. He writes, as we have already seen, "These
are many. My narrow understanding cannot see so many at once
in one gaze in order to delight in all at once." 29
Anselm faces the difficulty in the very same chapter by
showing that God.must be one in the strongest sense, referring to his one argument one last time to argue that neither
God nor God's eternity has any parts:
For whatever has been connected of parts is not entirely
one, but is in a certain sense more and different from
itself, and can be dissolved either by an action or by
the understanding. These things are foreign to You, than
whom nothing better can be thought. 30
Anselm concludes that to say that God is one, to say that
God is indivisible whether considered spatially or temporally, is to say that all of God is wholly present at every
place and at every time; "Since, therefore, neither You nor
Your eternity, which You are, have parts, there is no part
of You or Your eternity anywhere or ever, but all of You is
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Ibid., 114: "Quid es, Domine, quid es, quid te
intelliget cor meum? Certe vita es, sapientia es, veritas es,
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Ibid.:
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everywhere and all of Your eternity is always. " 31
The question of God's unity thus turns Anselm's thinking
to the question of God's relation to space and to time. In
Chapter 19, he argues that God is neither in space nor in
time, but rather that space and time are in God, and in
Chapter 20 he argues that God is before and beyond all other
things, whether those things are transitory or eternal. From
all this he concludes, in Chapter 22, that God is not only
one, but is also unique:
Therefore, Lord, You alone are what You are, and You are
who You are. For what is one thing as a whole and another in parts, and in which there is something mutable, is
not entirely what it is. And what begins from not being
and can be thought not to be, and (what) returns to not
being unless it subsists through another, and what has a
"having been" that it is not now and a "will be" that it
not yet is: this is not strictly and absolutely. You,
however, are what You are, because, whatever You are at
any time or in any way, this You are wholly and always. 32
He then reviews his progress so far, and closes by
echoing his preface to say what he would like to show: God
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Ibid., 115: "Quoniam ergo nee tu habes partes nee tua
aeternitas, quae· tu es: nusquam et numquam est pars tua aut
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semper."
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is, he writes, the one who "strictly and simply is, " 33 who
is all of the various qualities he has already discussed,
and is nevertheless nothing but "the one and highest good."
He confesses to God, "You [are the one], entirely sufficient
to Yourself, needing nothing, whom all things need in order
to be and to be well. " 34 At the end of Chapter 2 3, after he
has identified this unique God as God the trinity, Anselm
summarizes the line he has been pursuing by identifying God,
as we have seen, as, "the one necessary thing, in which is
every good, or, rather, which is every [good] and the one
[good] and the whole [good] and the only good." 35
Anselm is now ready to begin his celebration. He does so
in Chapter 24, with an exhortation to his soul to consider
the one necessary good that he has just identified, "Awaken
now, my soul, and lift up your whole understanding, and
think, as much as you can, what sort and how great is that
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It is worth mentioning that this is the final and
decisive evidence that Stolz is right in his interpretation of
"vere esse." Here Anselm says explicitly that God is the only
one that truly is.
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good." 36 Though he here tells his soul to think, the activity he intends is different from the thinking he has shown us
so far. Here, he asks his soul to consider a series of questions. He does not attempt to answer any of them. Each
question presents one way to celebrate God's goodness.
Whereas he sought, in the first half of the book, to express
the object of his thinking by analysis of his argument, he
does not attempt to do so here. Insofar as he does attempt
to express the object of the thinking that celebrates, its
expression is in the identification of God as the good he
will wonder at. This identification is the preparation for
his celebration, not the celebration itself.
We should compare just what the respective objects of
reasoning and celebration are. We have already seen that
Anselm's reasoning aims at a vision of God by showing how
his argument implies all his various beliefs about God. One
implication of the claim that Anselm's reasoning is critical, that it leads him to discover its limit, is that its
objects are Anselm's beliefs, namely: that God truly is,
that God is merciful, that God is just, that God is the life
by which God lives, etc. Anselm discovers that his reasoning
does not concern God as God is, but rather God as he believes God to be--that is, how God seems to him.
His celebration is different. All of the particular
36

Ibid.: "Excita nunc, anima mea, et erige totum
intellectum tuum, et cogita, quantum pates, quale et quantum
sit illud bonum."
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questions that he asks as part of his celebration aim at one
object: "the one necessary thing ••• which is every good."
These questions have a general form, which the reasoning he
uses to exhort his soul to consider them suggests. He continues:
If individual goods are delightful, think attentively
how delightful that good must be, which contains the
delight of all goods--and not such [delight] as we
experience in created things, but as different from it
as the creator differs from the creature. 37
With each of the questions that follows Anselm specifies one
aspect of the delight to be found in created things, and
with each he asks his soul how good that particular delight
mu.st be in the God who created it. Anselm spends the next
chapter, Chapter 25, going through a list of delights that
one might love and explaining how each one will be found
most of all in God.
What is important to note in all this is that Anselm's
manner of thinking has shifted. His thinking does remain
just what he defined thinking to be early in the book: it is
still a "saying in the heart." Anselm's thinking still
unfolds in speech. It is still his struggle to say what he
feels. This is true of his celebration no less than it is of
the analysis of his argument. But the grammar of his speech,
the grammar of his thinking, has undergone a dramatic
37

Ibid., 117-8: "Si enim singula bona delectabilia sunt,
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a creatura."
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change. Anselm no longer uses the indicative. Here, Anselm
thinks an imperative that commands an interrogative. He
commands himself to ask. Rather than trying to express what
God is, he commands himself to ponder how good God must be.
This shift is a promising solution to the problem he
encountered when he discovered that his argument fails to
enable him to see God as God is. For us to see this, however, it is necessary to go back for a moment to the very
beginning of the book. In its preface, Anselm writes that he
wrote the Proslogion, "in the persona of someone trying to
lift up his mind towards contemplating God and of one seeking to understand what he believes." 38 The analysis of the
one argument fails to lift Anselm's mind to the contemplation of God and to enable him to understand what he believes
because it brings him to discover that such thinking must
fall short.
That discovery is the discovery that he has been thinking only about what he believes. This fact about his thinking is, however, both a fact about Anselm and fact about God
because, for Anselm, to think truths is to think the Truth.
Anselm, however,.emphasizes the sense in which the discovery
of the distance between what God is and how God seems to him
is a discovery about himself. In Chapter 14, when he coneludes at first that he has found no more than the individu38

Ibid., 93-4: "sub persona conantis erigere mentem suam
ad contemplandum deum et quaerentis intelligere quod credit,
subditum scripsi opusculum."
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al truths he has considered, he then corrects himself, "[My
soul] strains so that it might see more, and it sees nothing
beyond what it has seen except darkness; rather, it does not
see darkness, which is not in You, but it sees that it
cannot see more because of its darkness. " 39

Anselm's soul

sees that beyond the various truths it has been able to see
in its argument, it sees only its own darkness.
His celebration, however, takes him farther. It does not
require that he express what God is, but only that he turn
his attention away from himself and towards God. Each of the
questions he commands himself to ask begins in him, but
points away from where it starts. The first can serve as an
example. Anselm asks, "If created life is good, how good is
the life that creates?" 40 He is to think how good his own
life is in order to wonder how good God's life must be. All
the other questions that serve his celebration take the same
form.
But here too Anselm finally admits his own failure.
Anselm's celebration, the attempt to see or understand what
God is by asking himself how good God must be, does not go
far enough. He confesses in the first part of Chapter 26
that nothing that he has said or considered has allowed him
39

Ibid., 111: "Intendit se ut plus videat, et nihil videt
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propter tenebras suas."
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to see what he would like to see. He writes, "I have not yet
spoken of or thought how greatly Your blessed ones will
rejoice. " 41 And here even his celebration ends.
Not even

thi~,

however, is the end of the Proslogion.

The Proslogion ends the way that it began. The character of
Anselm's thinking shifts a second and last time. At the
realization that even his celebration falls short, Anselm
turns to prayer. He writes, "God, I ask that I may know You,
that I may love You, so I may rejoice about You." But here,
because he has discovered how limited he is, he adds that
even if he cannot succeed completely here, in this life, he
still wishes to make progress until his joy is complete in
another. 42
Just as it is possible to describe the first shift in
Anselm's thinking as a shift in the grammar of his thinking,
so too this second one. Whereas his celebration was an
imperative that commanded him to ask, his prayer is simply
interrogative. Anselm asks God for the understanding that he
seeks.
And here again, the shift is promising. To see this one
need only consider what leads Anselm to judge that his
celebration has failed. His sense that the analysis of his
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argument falls short arises out of an experience--the feeling he has that he has not found God. His sense, however,
that his celebration has failed arises when he faces a text
from scripture that tells him that it could not have
succeeded. He writes, "But surely that joy, in which Your
chosen ones shall rejoice, neither the eye has seen, nor has
the ear heard, nor has it arisen in the heart of a man. " 43
Anselm cites First Corinthians 2:9. It tells him that whatever he might command himself to ask, he will not, as a man,
experience the full joy of seeing God, the good, whom he
asks about.
It should come as no surprise that the evidence he turns
to is authority. Anselm has, after all, explicitly gone
beyond what his own reasoning can teach him, and his experience cannot be expected, by itself, to show him its own
limit. He cannot experience that his experience falls short.
To do so would require that he experience something beyond
his experience. We should also note, however, that, faced
with the limit of his ability to celebrate God, he no more
repudiates his celebration than he did his reasoning.
When Anselm prays for further help, he does not, to be
·sure, overcome this limit, but he looks forward with hope to
the possibility that he will overcome it someday. He looks
forward with hope to the possibility that God will grant him
43

Ibid. , 121: "Sed gaudium illud certe, quo gaudebunt
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more than he can achieve himself. As Anselm prays in Chapter
26, he is hopeful, even confident. He expresses this confidence near the very end of the work:
Lord, through Your son You command, or rather You counsel [us] to seek and You promise [that we will] receive
so that our joy will be complete. I seek, Lord, what You
counsel ••• May I receive what You promise ••• so that my
joy will be complete. 44
In this final passage, Anselm makes two things clear: first,
that the whole work is a search that aims at an experience
of God that it cannot, by the means Anselm has, ever bring
about; and second, that as the one who undertakes that
search Anselm feels that he is doing what he can to deserve
the experience.
But the passage also suggests why the Proslogion must be
a prayer. Anselm has used two means to try to look at God:
he tries to express what God is and to celebrate how great
God's goodness must be. The first means can point to its own
shortcoming. The second raises questions, but offers no
answers. Prayer goes farther in two senses. On one hand,
once Anselm discovers that he has no means that can bring
him to understand God as he desires to, all he can do is ask
for more help, and this help is just what he prays for. On
the other hand, the only means that Anselm has of saying
exactly what he believes God to be is direct address. When
44
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Anselm says

"you~"

he need not wonder whom he is speaking

to. He speaks as one who has turned to, or lifted himself up
towards, God. When Anselm says "you," he is directing himself to God as precisely as he can.
He can direct himself to God as a "you," because God has
been with him from the start. This I have argued in several
places. When, in the beginning, he says what he believes God
to be, his words have meaning because God is already with
him. That is why the fool is a fool and not an atheist. When
he discovers that his argument is critical, he discovers
that his first attempt to lift his mind to the contemplation
of God has turned his attention to an aspect of himself-namely, what he believes about God, or what God seems to be.
He makes this discovery by reflecting upon the difference
between the God he has found in his reasoning and the God
whose presence he feels.
His celebration is his struggle to turn his attention
from himself to God. It is a second attempt to lift his mind
to the contemplation of God, but he is convinced that it
does not bring him to see how good God must be. It does,
however, point him once more towards God, and this fact is
reflected in his closing prayer. This prayer attempts neither to say what· God is nor to ask how good God must be. It
identifies God as a "you," a companion vividly present to
him, one who can be addressed.
In the final analysis, then, the Proslogion is a prayer
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that asks for an experience, or an understanding, of God. It
is worth noting that, as such, it closely parallels the
general outline of Anselm's other prayers. Sister Benedicta
Ward, who describes that outline, includes the Proslogion in
her translation of Anselm's prayers. She writes of the
prayers generally that they, "are meant to be said in solitude, and the aim is to stir the mind out of its inertia to
know itself thoroughly and so come to contrition and the
love of God. " 45 She adds, with reference specifically to the
Proslogion, that it is "set in the form of a prayer and
follows the Anselmian pattern of withdrawal, self-knowledge,
and compunction. " 46
This is easy enough to confirm. The Proslogion begins
with an exhortation that aims at stirring the mind (Chapter
1). The analysis· of the argument leads Anselm to self-knowledge, the discovery of the limit of his argument, which
leads Anselm to contrition. He writes in Chapter 18:
I was trying to rise up to the light of God, and I fell
back into my darkness. Or, rather, I did not fall back
into it, but I perceived myself to be enveloped in it. I
fell before my mother conceived me. Surely I was conceived in it, and was born wrapped up by it. Surely we
all once fell in him in whom we all sinned. 47
45

The Prayers and Meditations of Saint Anselm with the
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Finally, this failure leads him to wonder how good God must
be.
But though Sister Benedicta sees this form, she herself
makes little of it. For though she notices that the argument
is "a statement about what is beyond our thought, " 48 she has
nothing to say about how Anselm's analyses are connected to
his conviction that God is beyond his thought. I have argued
that this is first and foremost a conviction that rises out
of the experience that nothing he is able to see of God by
means of his argument shows him what he wants to see.
If, however, I am to explain the work in this way, there
is one more matter to discuss: this is not how Anselm describes what moves him to seek. In the preface to the work,
he writes that since the Monologion, which he had already
written, was "woven together by the interconnection of many
arguments, " 49 he began to search with himself to discover
whether there might be "one argument." I have already discussed what he says he wants that single argument to accomplish. From the perspective of all I have said, however, one
might be tempted to conclude that he does not find his argument, or that he finds an argument that fails, that all he
really finds is his own need for further help from God. But

sum. Olim certe in illo cecidimus, in quo omnes peccavimus."
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if this is what Anselm thinks of his one argument, why does
he not say so clearly? Why does he leave the Proslogion, the
record of a search that seems to fail? It would be easy to
argue that he cannot claim to follow the advice that God
gives him--that is, the advice to seek--unless he makes some
effort, but should one not expect him to discard the argument completely if all he discovers is that it must fail?
I myself do not think the question is a fair one, and
this for two reasons. In the first place, the discovery that
the analysis of his one argument cannot bring him to the
vision of God that he seeks is hardly a failure of the
argument. It is, after all, just this discovery that moves
Anselm to think in other ways. To say that the argument
fails is not quite right; it would be better to say that it
falls short. It enables Anselm to progress, but not to
complete the task he aims at.
To explain the second reason I must discuss one aspect
of the work that I have not considered thus far. I must
consider Anselm's brothers, the monks for whom he writes the
work. Those monks asked Anselm to write a justification of
the tenets of their faith that depended on reason alone. The
book that resulted was the Monologion. Anselm must have been
unhappy with the book. Something about that book moved him
to look farther, and there are stories that have come down
to us through his student, Eadmer, about the fervor with
which he sought for the insight he felt he needed. Anselm
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himself describes that fervor in the Proslogion's preface.
The insight he found became the argument that drives the
first part of the Proslogion, and Anselm spends, I have
argued, the middle part of the book overcoming it. Anselm
might then have discarded the insight, but he is writing for
those who desire reasons, who want analytical thought. If he
had rejected the desire for such thinking outright, they
might simply have turned elsewhere. The virtue of the
Proslogion is that it begins where the brothers it was
written for start: with the desire to understand by means of
the analytical thinking, the reasoning, that strives to express what something is.
In fact, whether Anselm could ever discard his argument,
even if it finally shows him its own limit, is at the very
least an open question. If discursive reason is part of what
characterizes us as what we are, then the need for an argument that points us beyond that part of us may never disappear. The existence of 900 years of interpretations that
attend only to Anselm's argument may be the strongest evidence that many of us do look for arguments--much as
Anselm's brothers did. In this sense, Anselm can confess
with confidence that he is looking for God, because he has
shown that his means of seeking has taken him as far as he
can go.
If, however,. the Proslogion ends in prayer, it is a
prayer that is in part determined by the thinking that has

143
preceded it. Anselm's argument is not superfluous to his
search for understanding. It is the rigorous pursuit of a
thinking that begins in prayer that turns Anselm to celebration. Celebration, in turn, turns him back to prayer.I set out to study Anselm's book in order to consider
how thinking can bring us to understanding. What I have
discovered is how Anselm's thinking orients him toward what
he desires to see. His thinking is his "saying in the
heart," his attempt to express what he feels about God. We
have seen that this begins as the attempt to articulate what
God is. When Anselm realizes that such thinking turns him
less to what God is than to what God seems to be, it also
turns him to wonder at the good that God must be. Anselm
celebrates that goodness, and that celebration constitutes a
second attempt to express what he feels about God. When
Anselm concludes that even this celebration fails to bring
him to see, or understand, God, he turns to address God
directly. Here, in a sense, he does express what God is: God
is one who is present to him. He can speak to God and ask
God for further help.
Just how much of what is true of Anselm's thinking about
God is also true of thinking generally may remain an open
question. But this study has suggested that it is not enough
to say what things seem to us to be. If we are to understand
anything, we must struggle to turn our attention directly
towards the things themselves. This does not mean that we
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will succeed in seeing what we strive to see. In fact, if
Anselm's case is an example, it suggests that we shall not.
Anselm's example also suggests, however, that we make progress as we strive.
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